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Abstract—This paper provides a state-of-the-art literature re-
view on economic analysis and pricing models for data collection
and wireless communication in Internet of Things (IoT). Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) are the main component of IoT which
collect data from the environment and transmit the data to
the sink nodes. For long service time and low maintenance
cost, WSNs require adaptive and robust designs to address
many issues, e.g., data collection, topology formation, packet
forwarding, resource and power optimization, coverage opti-
mization, efficient task allocation, and security. For these issues,
sensors have to make optimal decisions from current capabilities
and available strategies to achieve desirable goals. This paper
reviews numerous applications of the economic and pricing
models, known as intelligent rational decision-making methods,
to develop adaptive algorithms and protocols for WSNs. Besides,
we survey a variety of pricing strategies in providing incentives
for phone users in crowdsensing applications to contribute their
sensing data. Furthermore, we consider the use of some pricing
models in Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication. Finally,
we highlight some important open research issues as well as
future research directions of applying economic and pricing
models to IoT.
Keywords- Wireless sensor networks, crowdsensing network,
M2M communication, IoT, pricing models, economic models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is a novel paradigm which allows
billions of smart devices to be connected to the Internet. Such
devices can be sensors/actuators which are able to operate
and transmit data to other systems without or with minimal
human intervention [1]. The development of IoT has brought
a great influence to many areas, and there have been many IoT
applications implemented to improve the system performance
as well as the quality of life such as healthcare, transportation,
manufacturing, and so on [2]. Surveys of technologies and
applications of IoT were presented in [3], [4], [5], [6].
In IoT systems, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are one
of the most important components mainly used to collect
data from the environment and convey such data to the
central controllers for further processing. However, different
from conventional wireless sensor networks, sensors in IoT
are required to be “smarter” [1]. In particular, sensors in
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IoT can not only perform normal functions, e.g., sensing
information from the surrounding environment, but also make
optimal decisions without or with minimal human intervention
given their constrained resources and the dynamic of the
environment for the requested IoT services. In addition, with
billion of devices connecting to the Internet, it leads to
many challenges in efficiently controlling and managing IoT’s
sensors. Consequently, new approaches with more efficiency
and more flexibility to adapt to dynamic IoT networks need
to be developed.
Apart from classical approaches, e.g., optimization-based
approaches, economic and pricing based approaches have
been widely applied in IoT systems. Compared with the
optimization-based approaches, the economic and pricing
based approaches provide the following benefits:
• The primary and most important benefit of economic
approach is the revenue generation. The profit of IoT
systems must be maximized given the revenue and cost
incurred.
• Components in IoT have different objectives and con-
straints since they may belong to different entities, e.g.,
sensor owners, spectrum providers, and data center op-
erators. Pricing approaches are introduced to determine
optimal interactions among these self-interested and ra-
tional entities.
• IoT has employed new sensing paradigms such as par-
ticipatory sensing and crowdsensing networks to gather
data from portable smart devices. Thus, to attract the
users to contribute their data, incentive mechanisms using
pricing and payment strategies can be adopted in order to
guarantee the stable scale of participants and to improve
the accuracy, coverage, and timeliness of the sensing
results.
• Using economic and pricing models, e.g., auctions, allows
selecting the sensors with the highest remaining resources
to perform sensing tasks. This can guarantee a trade-off
between maximizing the network lifetime and providing
the required data quality for sensors. Moreover, the pric-
ing models can easily eliminate data redundancy without
the complexity computation.
Although there are some research works related to data
collection and communication in wireless sensor networks,
they focused on traditional approaches [7], [8]. Besides, there
are surveys related to the pricing approaches, e.g., [9], [10],
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2[11], but they addressed the issues in Internet or wireless
networks. Moreover, the surveys on applications of game
theory for wireless sensor network focus on general problems
not specifically from economic and pricing aspects [12], [13].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no survey specifically
discussing the use of economic models to deal with the data
collection and communication in IoT systems. This motivates
us to deliver the survey with the aim of providing the state-
of-the-art literature review on the economic models in IoT
networks. Thus, through this paper, the readers will understand
how economic models and pricing theory can be applied
to address data collection and communication issues in IoT
systems.
In this paper, we mainly survey the economic models for
solving data collection and communication in IoT. In particu-
lar, we classify the related works based on the WSN’s issues
as shown in Fig. 1. The issues consist of four major sections,
i.e., data exchange and topology formation, resource and
power allocation, sensing coverage, and security. Furthermore,
some related problems in IoT networks, e.g., faulty sensor
detection, pervasive monitoring, service’s utility maximization,
and deployment evaluation, as well as the M2M’s resource
allocation are also discussed. We also review economic models
together with efficient solutions for aforementioned problems.
In addition, advantages and disadvantages of the solutions are
also highlighted.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes a general architecture and services of IoT. Sec-
tion III introduces the background and basic of economic and
pricing models. In Sections IV-IX, we review the existing
work of IoT from various perspectives. More specifically,
Section IV discusses how to apply economic and pricing
models for aggregating the sensing data in interested areas.
Applications of economic and pricing models for resource
allocation to maximize the resource efficiency in the data
aggregation are given in Section V. Section VI employs pricing
models for solving problems concerning sensing coverage and
target tracking. Section VII considers economic approaches to
address the DoS attack and the privacy issues in the sensing
data collection. Section VIII reviews economic approaches for
some miscellaneous issues in IoT. In addition, applications of
pricing models for resource allocation in M2M communication
are discussed in Section IX. We highlight trends, outline some
open issues, and present some research directions in Section X.
Finally, we summarize and conclude the paper in Section XI.
II. GENERAL ARCHITECTURE AND SERVICES OF IOT
A. Definitions of IoT
The concept of IoT is broad, and there are a few definitions
available [14], [15], [2], [16]. In general, IoT refers to a self
configuring, adaptive, complex network that allows a variety of
things or objects, e.g., Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID)
tags, sensors, actuators, and mobile phones, through unique
addressing schemes, to interact and cooperate with each other
to reach common goals [5]. In addition to the definition, some
key features of IoT are given as follows [17]:
• Sensing capability: Things in IoT context are able to
perform sensing tasks.
• Heterogeneity: IoT may support for different underlying
networks, e.g., wired, wireless, and cellular, and a variety
of diverse communication devices, e.g., access point-
based, and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) fashion.
• Addressing modes: IoT may support for
anycast/unicast/multicast/broadcast transmissions.
• High reliability: IoT guarantees connectivity and reliable
transmissions based on different solutions.
• Self-* capabilities: Self-* capabilities of IoT are: (i) high
configuration autonomy, (ii) self-organization and self-
adaptation to dynamic scenarios, and (iii) self-processing
of the huge amounts of exchanged data.
• Secure environment: IoT guarantees the robustness to
secure issues such as network attacks (e.g., hacking
and DoS), authentication, data transfer confidentiality,
data/device integrity, privacy, and trusted secure environ-
ment.
B. Architeture of IoT
To meet the above features, several IoT architectures have
been provided [2], [5], [18], [19]. An IoT architecture is shown
in Fig. 2 which consists of the following different tiers:
• Devices: This physical layer is composed of low-level
devices, e.g., RFID tags, sensors, and smart devices.
Since they have limited resources in computing and
storage, their functions are to perform only primitive tasks
such as gathering data from the physical entities, e.g.,
environment conditions, or monitoring area of interests.
Other functions of the devices are to connect with Internet
gateways for data aggregation or to forward the data.
• Networking and communications: This layer consists of
data communication and networking infrastructures for
delivering data gathered from devices at the physical layer
to higher layers, e.g., cloud platform.
• Platform and data storage: This layer contains hardwares
and platforms in data centers or services in the cloud
with the aim of providing facility for the data access and
storage.
• Data management and processing: This layer can be an
application software which provides access services for
IoT users.
C. Resources and Services of IoT
Since IoT is a heterogeneous large-scale system with multi-
ple different resources and services, the resource management
is a key challenge to efficiently deliver IoT resources and
services to users [20]. In general, there are following resources
and services in IoT which can be traded through adopting
market and pricing models:
• Sensing data: Sensing data is gathered from devices at the
physical layer. The sensing information which is extracted
from the sensing data can be traded and priced as to
optimize the profits of owners [21], [22], [23].
• Power: IoT components, e.g., sensors, access points, base
stations, and servers, need energy for their operations. In
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Fig. 2. A general model of IoT.
monopoly markets, energy providers can maximize their
profits by optimizing the prices of energy supplied to the
IoT components [24], [25]. Recently, energy harvesting
from renewable resources is a viable solution for provid-
ing "self-energy recycling" to IoT sensors through energy
cooperation [26], in conjunction with the smart grid.
• Cloud services: They can be cloud data storage and
computation services which are available and traded to
IoT users [27].
• Spectrum and network bandwidth: In wireless network,
spectrum and bandwidth are precious resources for data
transmission. For example, in cognitive radio networks,
the spectrum can be traded in a dynamic fashion among
licensed users and unlicensed users with the aim of earn-
ing more revenue and improving the spectrum utilization.
In practice, caching can be a viable solution for saving
spectrum and network bandwidth in a large-scale IoT
network by utilizing the sensing data and information
stored in the cache, as long as the information value is
not outdated and are temporally valid.
• Data and information services: They can be offered and
integrated to support IoT applications in proving services
to IoT users, e.g., information searching, data mining
[28], and data security.
• Location-based services: By using real-time geographical
information from user devices such as smartphones or
tablets, IoT provides location services to interested indi-
viduals, organizations, and the government. The services
involve indoor and outdoor location services such as
4identifying a location of a person or an event, discovering
the nearest places, e.g., restaurants, coffee shops, and
stores [29]. Location-based services are also primary
services of the IoT with an expected revenue of £34.8
billion in 2020 (http://iotbusinessnews.com).
Among these resources, the sensing data and information
are the most important ones in IoT since they can maximize
the utility and profit of owners and providers [30]. To describe
how IoT changes business models, an IoT business model
(see Fig. 3) was presented in [31]. Basically, the IoT business
model consists of four main components in which the value
proposition of data resources is the core of the model. The
value proposition involves setting the price of the sensing
data resources and encouraging IoT users, i.e., customers’
willingness to pay. Since the value proposition will create the
major revenue for the businesses, choosing appropriate pricing
strategies is important in IoT business models. In the next
section, we will present the basics of pricing mechanisms and
market models that can be applied to IoT.
Value propositionInfrastructure:
- Key partners
- Resources (smart 
devices, cloud servers)
- Activities
(Advertising,billing...)
Data Data
Customer/IoT user:
- Channels (Phones, 
Internet)
- Customer segments
- Relations (Self-service, 
communities...)
Cost structure:
- Staff
- Marketing...
Revenue structure:
- Pricing
- Sales
Fig. 3. A general business model of IoT systems.
III. OVERVIEW AND FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMIC AND
PRICING THEORY APPLIED IN IOT
Economic and pricing approaches in developing IoT sys-
tems have received a lot of attention due to their benefits as
summarized in Section I. The classification of the commonly-
used economic and pricing approaches used in the data col-
lection and communication of IoT is shown in Fig. 4. For
convenience, they are categorized into three groups based
on how to set the price: economic concepts based pricing,
game theory and auction based pricing, and optimization based
pricing.
A. Economic Concepts Based Pricing
This section discusses well-known pricing strategies based
on the classical economic concepts such as cost, profit, demand
and supply functions.
1) Cost-based pricing: Cost-based pricing is a pricing
strategy which involves determining total cost of a commodity
and adding a percentage of the cost as a desired income or
profit. Mathematically, the selling price of a commodity is
defined by p = C×(1+m), where C is the total cost, m is the
markup which is the profit percentage added to the total cost.
The total cost of the commodity typically consists of the fixed
costs and variable costs. For example, to set the selling price
for the sensing data, the following costs are considered: the
fixed costs which are infrastructure costs, resource costs, e.g.,
energy and computational costs, and the variable costs which
are the data delivery costs and the labor cost. In the cost-based
pricing models, the profit maximization of the data seller was
proposed in [32] or of the information service provider as
shown in [33]. Moreover, the model was employed to select
data communication mode at low costs, i.e., opportunistic
networks, as shown in [34]. The main advantage of the cost-
based pricing is its simplicity since it requires only the internal
cost information to set and adjust the selling price. However,
this strategy does not consider external market factors, e.g.,
the competitors, the demand and the response of buyers. More
information about the cost based-pricing model can be found
in [35], [36].
2) Consumer perceived value pricing: Pricing strategies
based on covering costs are easily copied by competitors.
Therefore, to maximize long-term profits, a seller needs to set
the price by considering the buyer’s perceived value from the
commodity or the service rather than using traditional costs.
The buyer’s perceived value is the overall benefit derived at the
price that the buyer is willing to pay. To set the price based on
the perceived value, it is necessary to identify the set of value
drivers that (1) present value perceptions about the commodity
and the seller, (2) create positive attitudes and feelings, (3)
provide the basis for differentiation, and (4) provide the reason
to buy the commodity. In particular for the sensing data
market in which the buyers may be service providers or data
collectors, there are five major value drivers which impact the
data pricing, that is pv = f(ve, vp, vs, vm, vc) [37], where:
• ve is the economic value which is based on buyer’s
perceptions about the costs of generating the sensing data.
• vp is the performance value which is based on buyer’s
perceptions of the utility of the data. A utility is an
economic term referring to the total satisfaction received
from consuming a commodity or service [38]. Therefore,
the data utility is the most important factor for the pricing
decision which may involve associated features such as
the accuracy, quality, and timeliness.
• vs is the supplier value which is based on buyer’s
perceptions about the credibility, i.e., reputation, of the
data seller.
• vm is the buyer’s psychological motivations for a partic-
ular purchase.
• vc is the situation context that may have effect on
purchasing behavior of the buyer.
Generally, since the perceived value is the tradeoff between
the perceived utility to be received and the perceived price
for acquiring the information, sellers should understand these
tradeoffs to maximize the buyer’s value and seller’s outcomes.
In IoT market, consumer perceived value pricing model is
efficient to estimate the consumers’ potential demand for the
data through determining their willingness and affordability
[39]. It is also used to maximize the profit of the information
service provider in the market based on the variation of
consumers’ perception value of the information [40].
3) Supply and demand model: Although the consumer
perceived value pricing considers more about the demand of
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buyers, it ignores the incomplete information conditions and
market competition. Supply and demand model can tackle the
problem. The supply and demand are parts of the economic
model in which the relations between these two factors can
be exploited to determine the price of a commodity in a
market [35]. Consider a competitive market in which multiple
sellers and buyers compete for sensing data. Assume that
the relationship between the price P for a data unit and
the quantity demanded Qd is expressed by a linear demand
function as P = a− bQd, with a and b are coefficients of the
function. Similarly, a linear supply function which presents the
relationship between P and the quantity supplied Qs is given
by P = c + dQs. Accordingly, the sellers and the buyers
tend to change the price and the quantity to maximize their
objective functions, e.g., profit and utility, subject to some
constraints, e.g., budget and technology. As shown in Fig. 5,
the behaviors of the buyers and the sellers can be used to
determine a unique point called a market equilibrium, i.e.,
an economic equilibrium, at which the quantity demanded
equals the quantity supplied, i.e., Qd = Qs = Q∗, and
P = P ∗ = (a− c)/(b+ d)Q∗. At the market equilibrium, the
price and the quantity are respectively called the competitive
price, i.e., market clearing price, and the competitive quantity
or the market clearing quantity. The market equilibrium has
some basic properties as indicated in [41]: (i) the behavior
of sellers and buyers is consistent since the demand equals
supply, (ii) no seller or buyer has an incentive to change its
behavior since their actual trades equal their desired trades,
(iii) and the equilibrium is the outcome of the tatonnement
process, meaning that at any non-equilibrium price, there will
be excess supply or demand which leads to a movement in
price towards the equilibrium. Since the buyers are highly
sensitive to the price change, this model can guarantee fairness
among the buyers [42] and provides an optimal allocation.
P (data price)
P* 
Q* 
a
c
Q (data quantity)
(P*,Q*)
d
P = a - bQ
s
P =
c +
 dQ
Fig. 5. Supply and demand model for sensing data market.
The market equilibrium balances the supply and the demand
of the network resources and the sensing data in multi-modal
sensor networks [43]. It also helps consumers achieve a desired
information quality [44], [45]. Also, the model was used for
the flexible spectrum sharing as proposed in [46], [47].
4) Smart data pricing: To avoid large peak demands cre-
ated by users’ simultaneous consumption of scarce resources,
the Smart Data Pricing (SDP) schemes are proposed. The SDP
refers to various techniques such as charging buyers depending
on the resource usage time, setting location based tariffs, and
imposing prices based on buyer activity levels. We consider
two common approaches used in IoT which are the time-
dependent pricing and the usage-based pricing. The objectives
are to reduce the network congestion by stimulating buyers to
consume less resources or shift their usage to less congested
times.
6• Time-dependent pricing: In time-dependent pricing,
prices of the resource have a temporal component, i.e., the
prices vary over different time to discourage large peak
demands [48]. Only then will buyers be incentivized to
diffuse their demands over time, thus improving network
resource efficiency by reducing the peaks and filling up
the valley periods.
• Usage-based pricing: The classical flat pricing models,
i.e., price is set statically, fail to adapt to the resource
demand and to guarantee fairness. A more effective
resource pricing model called usage-based pricing can be
used. Accordingly, users are charged according to access
rate or resource usage [49]. It is stated that if the price is
set based on the usage, a fair and efficient use of resources
would be moderately promoted to some extent.
The two above approaches to managing the network con-
gestion can help create a "win-win" solution for both ser-
vice providers and their users. The service providers benefit
by reducing peak congestion while users are offered more
choices and technologies to save on their costs. Compared
to the demand-and-supply model, the SDP has no need of
the iteration to determine the market-clearing price, meaning
that the market is cleared as soon as buyers have submitted
their bids for access [50]. In IoT systems, the SDP has been
introduced as an alternative to address resource management
issues, e.g., power management [15], [51], resource demand
management [52], and price setting for resources in cloud
computing applications [53].
5) Option pricing: An option concept in finance is a
contract which gives the buyer, i.e., the owner of the option,
the right to buy or sell an underlying asset or instrument at
a fixed price, i.e., a specified strike price, at any time on or
before a specified date [54]. The buyer then pays a price, also
known as the premium, to the seller in exchange for the right
granted by the option. To determine the price or value of an
option, the Black-Scholes model in the option pricing theory is
typically used. Accordingly, the price of a real option depends
on various factors such as the current value and the uncertainty
of expected cash flows, the value of fixed costs, the risk free
rate of return, the time to maturity of the option, and any value
lost over the duration of the option. Mathematically, the price,
i.e., the value, of a real option based on the Black-Scholes
model is given by [55]
P = SN(d1)−N(d2)Ke−rt, (1)
where P is the value of the option, S is the current price of
expected cash flows, t is the expiration time of the option, K
is the exercise price, and r is the risk-free interest rate. N(di)
denotes the cumulative standard density function evaluated at
di, where d1 and d2 are defined as follows:
d1 =
ln(S/K) + (r + σ2/2)t
t1/σ
and d2 = d1 − t1/σ, (2)
with σ is the variance of expected cash flows. Since the
expected cash flows are uncertain, they must be estimated via
the use of fuzzy logic.
In IoT, the Black-Scholes model can be applied for the
IoT investment evaluation [56], the resource reservation in
M2M communication [57], and the task schedule for sensors
[58]. For example, for evaluating IoT investment projects, the
relation between variables in equation (1) and those of the
project are given as follows: the current value of project is
current value of the real option, the investment cost of the
project is the exercise price, the riskiness/uncertainty of the
project is the price uncertainty, and the time value of money
is the risk-free rate. The applications of the real option theory
for resource reservation and the task schedule will be given in
the survey section.
B. Game Theory and Auction Based Pricing
Game theory and auction are the formal study of decision-
making where several players must make choices that poten-
tially affect the interests of the other players. The players in
this context may be sensing data buyers, sellers or service
providers. This section discusses how to set the price for
sensing data in IoT using the auction and the game theoretic
frameworks.
1) Non-cooperative game: A game is known as non-
cooperative if it is not possible for the players to form
coalitions or make agreements. To interpret the definition of
the game, some terminologies are given below.
• Payoff : A payoff is a real number, i.e., a utility or an
interest, which reflects the desirability of an outcome to
a player.
• Player: A player is a participant which makes decisions
in a game.
• Rationality: A player is rational if it always plays in a
way which maximizes its own payoff.
• Strategy: Player’s strategy is a complete plan of ac-
tions/instructions that the player can choose [12], and the
payoff depends on not only its own actions but also the
action of others.
Consider a sensing data market in which sellers compete
for selling their data. The market can be modeled as a
non-cooperative game in which the players are the sellers
with their pricing strategies. Let (P, pi) be a game with n
sellers and Pi be a set of pricing strategies of seller i,
where P = P1 × · · · × Pn is the Cartesian product of the
individual strategy sets, and pi = (pi1(p), . . . , pin(p)) ∈ Rn
is a vector of payoffs of the sellers. Let pi ∈ Pi be the
pricing strategy of seller i, then we have a vector of strategies
p = (p1, ..., pn) of n sellers, and a vector pi which consists
of the strategy choices of all sellers except the ith seller, i.e.,
pi = (p1, ..., pi−1, pi+1, ..., pn). Given a vector of strategies p,
seller i achieves payoff pii(p) which is a real value function of
the seller’s chosen strategy and strategies of the others. A set
of strategies p∗ = (p∗1, ..., p
∗
n) ∈ P is the Nash equilibrium if
none of the sellers can improve its payoff by deviating its own
strategy when other sellers keep their strategies fixed, that is
[59]
∀i, pi ∈ Pi : pii(p∗i , p∗i ) ≥ pii(pi, p∗i ). (3)
Inequality (3) implies that sellers at the Nash equilibrium
have no incentive to change their own strategies since the
payoffs are worse off. This makes the Nash equilibrium a
7consistent solution concept for games. However, sometimes
there is no Nash equilibrium at all. Moreover, there may exist
multiple Nash equilibria in a game, thus players may not be
clear about which one to focus on. Therefore, it is important
to check the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
when setting price using the non-cooperative game.
The non-cooperative game theory covers a broad range
of areas of IoT. For example, it can be used for resource
allocation in wireless networks [60] or in sensor networks [61].
Also, it can be used for the spectrum sharing among a primary
user and multiple secondary users [62]. In the cloud computing
area, the non-cooperative game theory is used to maximize the
profits of the competitive cloud providers [63]. Moreover, it
can be used for the sensing coverage optimization [64].
2) Stackelberg game: The Nash equilibrium solution ob-
tained from non-cooperative games assumes that the sellers
know each other’s strategies and they are announced at the
same time. However, in real markets, these assumptions may
not always hold, and thus the sellers cannot calculate its Nash
strategy. Therefore, a seller can wait until the other seller’s
strategy is announced and then solves an optimization problem
for its corresponding strategy, i.e., the strategies are given
sequentially. Such a game is known as the Stackelberg game
[65]. It was stated that in a Stackelberg game, if a seller has
to announce its strategy first, its payoff is not lower than the
corresponding Nash solution. Definition and properties of the
Stackelberg game are given as follows.
Assume that the game consists of two sensing data sellers
and P1 and P2 are the sets of pricing strategies for sellers 1
and 2, respectively. The strategy of seller 1 is to maximize its
payoff function pi1(p1, p2) while seller 2 maximizes its payoff
function pi2(p1, p2), with p1 and p2 are the chosen strategies
of sellers 1 and 2, respectively. Assume that seller 2 selects its
strategy first, and thus it is called the leader. Seller 1 selects
its strategy second, and it is called the follower.
Definition 1. If there exists a mapping T : P2 → P1
such that, for any fixed p2 ∈ P2, pi1(Tp2, p2) ≥ pi1(p1, p2)
for all p1 ∈ P1, and if there exists a p2s2 ∈ P2 such that
pi2(Tp2s2, p2s2) ≥ pi2(Tp2, p2), then the pair (p1s2, p2s2) ∈
P1×P2, where p1s2 = Tp2s2, is called a Stackelberg strategy
pair with seller 2 as leader and seller 1 as follower.
In other words, the Stackelberg strategy is optimal for the
leader when the follower reacts with the follower’s optimal
strategy. Let the graph D1 = {(p1, p2) ∈ P1×P2 : p1 = Tp2}
of the mapping T be called the rational reaction set of seller 1
when seller 2 chooses strategy p2 ∈ P2. By playing according
to the set D1, seller 1 is a rational player. Similarly, D2 is the
rational reaction set of seller 2 if seller 1 is the leader. From
D1 and D2, there are the two following propositions.
Proposition 1. A strategy pair (p1s2, p2s2) is a Stackelberg
strategy with seller 2 as leader iff (p1s2, p2s2) ∈ D1 and
pi2(p1s2, p2s2) ≥ pi2(p1, p2), ∀(p1, p2) ∈ D1.
Proposition 2. A strategy pair (p1N , p2N ) is a Nash strategy
pair iff (p1N , p2N ) ∈ D1 ∩D2.
These propositions show that in the Stackelberg game, the
leader obtains at least as good performance in terms of payoff
function as the corresponding Nash solution. The reason is
that when a leader chooses a Stackelberg strategy, the leader
is actually imposing a solution which will facilitate itself.
In sensing information market, the Stackelberg game can be
applied to analyze the strategic options and payoff function
between information provider and intermediaries [40], or to
maximize the profits of different participants of IoT industry
value chain [66]. Besides, it was used for the distributed
relay selection and power control for multiuser cooperative
communication [67], or for enhancing both the QoS and the
network’s robustness in sensor networks [68].
3) Bargaining game: Bargaining games refer to the situa-
tions in which two or more players must reach an agreement
regarding how to distribute an object. Consider a simple
sensing data market including a single data seller which faces
a single potential buyer. A bargain is successful if and only
if the sensing data is transferred at a mutually acceptable
price. Let rs be the seller’s reservation price which is the
smallest monetary sum that it will accept, and rb be the buyer’s
reservation price that it is willing to pay for the data. The
seller and the buyer respectively submit price offers, ps and
ps, which are considered as their strategies. The strategy of the
seller is to determine p∗s at which its expected profit pis(ps, rs)
is maximized, i.e., pis(p∗s, rs) ≥ pis(ps, rs), ∀ps. Similarly,
the buyer determines its offer p∗b which makes its expected
profit pib(pb, rb) maximum, i.e., pib(p∗b , rb) ≥ pib(pb, rb), ∀pb.
If p∗b ≥ p∗s , a bargain is enacted and the data is sold at the
sale price, p = kp∗b + (1 − k)p∗s , with 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. A pair
of the best response offer strategies (p∗b , p
∗
s) constitute the
Nash bargaining equilibrium at which no player can increase
its expected profit by unilaterally altering its chosen strategy.
Since the Nash bargaining equilibrium is a solution of a
cooperative game, it is used to enhance the users’ own trans-
mission opportunities and achieve high spectrum efficiency
[69] or an efficient energy management [70]. It also guarantees
a full utilization of the spectrum resources while improving the
utility of selfish users [71] or addresses the resource sharing
problem between the secondary users and the primary user
[72].
4) Auction: An auction is a public sale of buying and
selling items, e.g., sensing data and bandwidth. The auction
consists of an explicit set of rules which determine resource
allocation and prices of the basis from market participants [73].
Basic terminologies used in auction theory can be defined as
follows:
• Bidder: A bidder, i.e, buyer, wants to buy items in
auction. In data aggregation, a bidder may be a data
collector or a service provider who wants to buy data
for their own purposes.
• Seller: A seller, e.g., a sensor and a mobile device, wants
to sell items.
• Auctioneer: An auctioneer controls an auction and an-
nounces the winner.
• Price: A price in auction, i.e., a hammer price, is the
price at which the buyer and the seller agree to make a
deal. There are two types of auction price, i.e., asking
price and bidding price. A seller submits an ask which
indicates the asking price on the item to be sold while a
buyer can submit a bid indicating the bidding price for
the requested item.
8Theoretically, there are several types of auctions. A taxon-
omy of auctions for resource allocation in wireless networks
was given in [74]. For the rest of this section, we introduce
the details of auction types often used in data aggregation and
communication in IoT.
(a) Sealed-bid auctions: In sealed-bid auction, buyers sub-
mit simultaneously their sealed bids to the auctioneer. Differ-
ent from open-cry auctions (e.g., English auction and Dutch
auction) which allows buyers to observe their rival’s bids and
then to choose or revise their own bids, in the sealed-bid
auction, each buyer does not know the other buyers’ bidding
strategies and thus cannot change its bid. There are two kinds
of sealed-bid auctions.
• k-th-price sealed-bid auction: First-price and second-
price sealed-bid auctions are the two most important k-
th-price sealed-bid auction. In the first-price sealed-bid
auction, a buyer with highest price wins the item and
pays the seller the highest price. The price in the first-
price sealed-bid auction is defined by pF = max
p∈P
p, with
P is the set of bidding prices. In the second-price sealed-
bid auction, i.e., the Vickrey auction [75], the winner
pays the second-highest price rather than the price that it
submitted, i.e., pV = max
p∈P\{pi}
p, with pi is the highest
price of the winner. With this rule, the winner can never
affect the price that it pays, so there is no incentive
for any bidder to misrepresent its value. The bidding
true valuation is called the dominant strategy. Therefore,
the outcome of the second-price auction meets a strong
criterion of dominant strategy equilibrium, meaning that
each bidder has a well-defined best bid value regardless of
how high the bidder believes its rivals will bid [76]. It is
noted that any dominant strategy equilibrium is always
a Nash equilibrium. Differently, the first-price sealed-
bid auction has no dominant strategy equilibrium but it
satisfies the weaker criterion of Nash equilibrium.
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction: A VCG auction
is actually a generalized Vickrey auction with multiple
items for sale [77]. The basic idea behind the VCG
auction is that the winner has to pay for the loss of the
social value due to its getting item. Assume that there is
a set of items for sale T = {t1, t2, . . . , tM}, with M is
number of items and ti implies ith item, and a set of N
bidders B = {b1, b2, . . . , bN}. Let a bid of bidder bi for
item tj be vi(tj) and also VMN be social value created by
M items. According to the VCG auction rule, if vi(tj) is
the highest, i.e., the bidder bi wins to obtain item tj , the
price that the bidder has to pay for the winning is given
by
VMN\{bi} − V
M\{tj}
N\{bi} . (4)
The outcome of a VCG auction is a Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium [78] and will be further described in Section IV-A2.
(b) Forward, reverse, and double auctions: The auctions
mentioned above are classified based on the seller’s side and
they are the forward auctions. Considering the buyer’s side,
there are reserve and double auctions. More specifically, we
have the following definitions:
• Forward auction: In a forward auction, buyers bid for
items by offering increasingly higher prices, as illustrated
in Fig. 6(a).
• Reverse auction: In a reverse auction, sellers compete
for buyers’ attraction by submitting their asks to the
auctioneer as shown in Fig. 6(b), and thus the price
typically decreases to the lowest price that the buyer can
accept. The reverse auction can be combined with other
auction mechanisms, e.g., sealed-bid reverse auctions.
• Double auction: A double auction is reminiscent of Wal-
rasian auction [79] which perfectly matches the supply
and demand model. In a double auction, buyers and
sellers simultaneously submit their bids and asks to an
auctioneer, respectively [80]. The auctioneer defines a
price p, i.e., a clearing price, at which the asks from
sellers are less than p while the bids from buyers are
more than p. Typically, the clearing price is set as
p = (pi + aj)/2, where pi is price of the ith bidder
and aj is price of the jth seller. The clearing price
and the corresponding allocated commodities determine
a competitive equilibrium, i.e., a market equilibrium,
where the supply in the market is equal to the demand
in the market. An example of using the double auction
for cooperative communications is given in Fig. 6(c).
Accordingly, relay nodes (i.e., sellers) submit their asking
prices to sell their relay services while source nodes (i.e.,
buyers) bid these services for cooperative communication.
Once receiving the asks and the bids, the base station (i.e.,
auctioneer) determines winners and clearing prices. The
detail algorithms of the double auction process will be
described in Section V-A2.
(c) Combinatorial auction: In a combinatorial auction, a
buyer submits its bid along with the need of a whole bundle
of multiple items [82]. Based on the constraints included in the
bid as well as the capacity of item allocation from sellers, the
auctioneer finds an optimal allocation which is also considered
as the winner of the auction. Compared to standard auctions,
e.g., the sealed-bid auction, combinatorial auctions have more
advantages, e.g., little global information requirement, eco-
nomic efficiency, utility maximization for buyers, and revenue
maximization for sellers. However, a computational burden
is a challenge of the combinatorial auction since the winner
determination for this auction is an NP-complete problem,
meaning that there is no known polynomial-time algorithm to
find the optimal allocation. Typically, only algorithms which
find approximated solutions for the combinatorial auction have
been proposed, e.g., the Lagrangian relaxation approach as
shown in [83].
The auctions mentioned above and their corresponding
applications in IoT are summarized in Table I. We can observe
that several applications in IoT can employ auction mecha-
nisms. Moreover, the sealed-bid auctions, e.g., the first-price
and second-price sealed-bid auctions, are more commonly
used than the others due to their simplicity and privacy
guarantee [84].
Apart from the above-mentioned pricing strategies, we close
this section with a posted price mechanism which is typically
used in online procurement markets.
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SUMMARY OF COMMON AUCTIONS AND KEY FEATURES.
Auction type Market structure Key descriptions Suitable scenarios Solution
First-price
sealed-bid auction
[76]
A seller, multiple
buyers, and an
auctioneer
Private bidding process, and winning buyer pays the
highest price
• Economics: buyer’s payoff max-
imization
• Technical: data aggregation, re-
source allocation, routing proto-
col, and privacy concerns
Nash equilibrium
Second-price
sealed-bid auction/
Vickrey auction
[75]
A seller, multiple
buyers, and an
auctioneer
Private bidding process, and winning buyer pays the
second highest price
• Economics: buyer’s payoff max-
imization
• Technical: data aggregation, con-
gestion management, resource al-
location, and privacy concerns
Nash equilibrium
VCG [77]
A seller; multiple
buyers; and an
auctioneer
Generalized Vickrey auction with multiple items;
private bidding process; winner pays for the loss of
the social value due to its winning the item
• Economics: social welfare maxi-
mization
• Technical: data aggregation; and
resource allocation
Bayesian Nash
equilibrium
Double [80]
Multiple sellers,
multiple buyers,
and an auctioneer
Both buyers and sellers submit their bids and asks,
respectively
• Economics: ordinary markets
• Technical: resource allocation Market equilibrium
Combinatorial [82]
A seller, multiple
buyers, and an
auctioneer
Multiple heterogeneous auction items, and certain
bundles of items have the highest value
• Economics: payoff maximization
for buyers, and resource effi-
ciency maximization
• Technical: data aggregation, and
resource allocation
Optional solution
Seller
Buyer
Seller
Seller
Auctioneer
Ask
Ask
Ask
Payment
(b)
Auctioneer
Auctioneer
(c)
Seller
Buyer
Buyer
Seller
Bid
Ask Ask
Bid
Buyer
Seller
Bid
Bid
Bid
Buyer Buyer
Data
(a)
Fig. 6. Different kinds of auctions: (a) forward auction for data aggregation
with a single seller, (b) reverse auction for data aggregation with a single
buyer, and (c) double auction for cooperative communication [81].
5) Posted price mechanism: In an online procurement mar-
ket, i.e., a digital market, sellers arrive in a sequential order
to offer their commodities, and a buyer decides to accept or
reject the offer without full knowledge of the actual costs of the
commodities [85]. Assume that sellers are rational, they may
exaggerate their costs to earn more profits. To learn the sellers’
actual costs, bidding mechanisms (e.g., sealed-bid auctions)
can be used through soliciting an ask from each seller upon
its arrival. However, the bidding mechanisms are unnecessarily
complex [86], and the posted price mechanism which gives
sellers "take-it-or-leave-it" offers is a preferred alternative.
The posted price mechanism posts a specific price for each
seller. If a seller’s actual cost is below the price offered by
the mechanism, the seller accepts the price, and the buyer
purchases from the seller at the price. Otherwise, the seller
rejects the offer. Based on the current buyer’s responses, the
mechanism will set prices for subsequent sellers’ commodities.
Generally, compared with the bidding models, the posted price
mechanism is less complex since it decides an offer price
without observing the sellers’ asks and pays the seller only if
its ask does not exceed the offer. Therefore, in IoT, the posted
price mechanism is widely used for the data aggregation in
crowdsensing networks in which the data sellers, i.e., phone
users, arrive in a sequential order.
C. Pricing Schemes Based on Utility Maximization and Knap-
sack Problem
This section discusses two approaches using the mathemat-
ical optimization to determine the price.
1) Utility maximization: Utility is a term to represent
the level of preference, i.e., the satisfaction, that a buyer
receives from consuming goods or services. The different
satisfaction of different buyers to various price scenarios can
be modeled analytically by adopting the utility function from
microeconomics [87]. A good approach to understand how
to set the price based on utility functions is the introduction
of the Network Utility Maximization (NUM) problem [88] to
allocate the transmission rate to sensors, i.e., buyers, in WSNs.
Accordingly, the rate allocation can be characterized as the
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solution of the following NUM problem:
SY STEM(U,A,C) : maximize
∑
s
Us(rs) (5)
subject to Ar ≤ C
over r ≥ 0,
where Us(rs) is the utility function of buyer s depending on
the allocated rate rs, A is a 0-1 matrix, each of which Ajs
allows to determine whether the resource j belongs to the
route of buyer s or not. The constraint C contains elements
Cj which is the finite capacity of resource j. Typically, the
utility functions of buyers are not known to the seller, e.g., a
resource allocator. Therefore, one can divide (5) equally into
two sub-optimization problems. The first sub-optimization is
the utility maximization problem for buyer s
USERs(Us;λs) : maximize Us(
ps
λs
)− ps
over ps ≥ 0, (6)
where ps = rsλs is the price that buyer s must pay for
allocated rate rs, and λs is the charge per unit for the
buyer. The second sub-optimization problem is the network’s
optimization problem given by
NETWORK(A,C; p) : maximize
∑
s∈S
ps lg rs
subject to Ar ≤ C
over r ≥ 0, (7)
Assume that the utility function Us(rs) is an increasing,
strictly concave and continuously differentiable function of
rs. The authors in [89] indicated that there exists a unique
optimal solution (r∗ = (r∗1 , . . . , r
∗
S), λ
∗ = (λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
S), p
∗ =
(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
S)) which can solve the three above optimization
problems. The vector r∗ is the unique optimal allocating vector
rate and λ∗ is the current optimal resource price vector.
In addition to the rate allocation for sensors, the utility
maximization scheme is used for the bandwidth supply and
demand balance [90], or the optimal congestion and contention
control [91].
In practice, the above optimal solution is obtained only
when the user utilities are assumed as concave functions.
However, for hybrid service systems, e.g., video and voice
applications, such utilities vary with different types of applica-
tions with inelastic flows. Therefore, the pricing and resource
allocation problem may be a non-convex optimization problem
[92], and the NUM framework is no longer appropriate.
2) Multi-objective knapsack problem: The knapsack prob-
lem is a problem in combinatorial optimization which has been
widely applied in both industry and financial management.
The knapsack problem can be described as follows: given a
non-negative real number M and a set of N objects where
each object i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is assigned a pair (vi, wi) of
non-negative real numbers. The values of vi and wi can be
interpreted as the utility and the weight of an object i while
M can be interpreted as the capacity of a knapsack, meaning
that the maximum weight that the knapsack can hold. The
goal is to find subset S of objectives that maximizes v(S)
subject to the constraint w(S) ≤ M , with v(S) = ∑i∈S vi
and w(S) =
∑
i∈S wi [93]. In other words, the goal is finding
a collection of the most valuable objects with the knapsack
capacity constraint.
For more clarity, we take an example of applying the knap-
sack problem to selecting the active sensors, i.e., objectives, for
performing a sensing task. The goal is to select a subset of the
sensors such that the sum of their utilities is optimized under
the constraint of a certain energy budget M . The value of M
is defined as the amount of energy necessary to accomplish
a specific task, and weight wi of sensor i is its energy cost
when participating in the task. The utility of sensor i may
involve its potential relevance Ri (e.g., sensing data quality),
and its residual energy ei, as shown in [94]. Then, the objective
function of the knapsack problem is given by
maximize
N∑
i=1
xi(αRi + β(ei − wi))
subject to
N∑
i=1
xiwi ≤M,
(8)
where xi = 1 if sensor i is selected to participate in the task,
and 0 otherwise. Coefficients α and β are used to balance
the priorities depending on specific applications. Although the
knapsack problem is NP-hard, it can be solved optimally in
pseudo-polynomial time through dynamic programming algo-
rithm [95]. The term pseudo-polynomial means polynomial
if the input (e.g., the value M in equation (8)) is given in
unary encoding. A pseudo-polynomial time algorithm is the
algorithm that runs in time which is a polynomial in the input
size, not the value the input represents.
Apart from the above example, we can also find other
applications of the knapsack problem in IoT, e.g., sensing data
collection [96], [97], or building new IoT-aware placement
algorithms [98].
IV. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR DATA EXCHANGE AND TOPOLOGY FORMATION
As stated earlier, a WSN normally consists of a large
number of autonomous and resource-limited nodes which
cooperate to perform one or more sensing tasks within an area
of interest. The coordination among them forms a communi-
cation network such as a homogeneous multi-hop network,
or a hierarchical network. The main sensors’ functions are
to sense, process, and transmit data to a base station which
is also known as a sink node. A sensor may send its data
directly to a sink node or through other sensors. However,
the topology and transmission routes of sensor networks may
considerably fluctuate over time, e.g., a new sensor joins
or leaves the network, or congestion appears at nodes. This
section reviews applications of economic and pricing models
of the data exchange and topology formation which can be
summarized as follows:
• Data aggregation and routing: Data aggregation is de-
fined as the process where the data is aggregated from
multiple sensors. It is crucial in removing the data
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redundancy as well as saving the energy required for
information transmission to the sink node [99], [100].
Towards this, the use of sophisticated "compressed sens-
ing" algorithms [101] is of great importance, which leads
to more energy-efficient data aggregation. In conjunction
with this compressed sensing algorithm, the "sparsity
level" can be controlled adaptive to the time-varying
channel conditions, and hence the data aggregation may
be jointly designed and optimized with the opportunistic
transmission strategy below. With such joint design and
optimization, the economic and pricing models for data
exchange and topology formation can be more adaptive
to the energy state and channel state of mobile sensors,
subject to the QoS of the requested services offered to
the IoT users.
• Opportunistic transmission strategy: Opportunistic trans-
mission strategy is a technique which exploits avail-
able channels for data transmission. The use of pricing
strategies helps sensor nodes achieve the highest usage
efficiency of bandwidth as well as energy.
• Relay selection: Due to the energy and bandwidth con-
straints, the data transmission between a sensor node
and its destination may be accomplished by relay nodes.
Pricing models have been proved as efficient approaches
to select relay nodes for forwarding the data.
• Congestion control: When there are more than one packet
arriving at a node at the same time, the congestion
occurs. Pricing mechanisms can be used to manage the
congestion efficiently.
A. Data Aggregation and Routing
This section considers the applications of economic and
pricing models for the data aggregation process in WSNs and
in crowdsensing networks.
1) Data aggregation and routing for typical WSNs: A
common model of data aggregation in WSNs is shown in
Fig. 7(a) which is composed of sensors, a mobile collector and
a sink. The mobile collector is to gather data from sensors and
then transmit it to the sink node via wireless channels. Due
to the energy and capacity constraints of sensors and wireless
links, improving energy efficiency and network lifetime is one
of the most important issues [102]. However, they also have
to guarantee the required Quality of Service (QoS), e.g., high
data quality and low latency. This conflict makes economic and
pricing models become very useful in WSNs. In this section,
we review the most recent approaches using economic and
pricing models to achieve a trade-off between the network
lifetime maximization and the required service quality.
Sealed-bid reverse auction: The reverse auction selects
the sensors with the highest remaining energy as winners for
contributing sensing data. This approach allows to minimize
the redundant information while maintaining high energy effi-
ciency. Such an approach can be found in [103] with the aim
of prolonging the network lifetime which is defined as the time
span from the deployment to the time at which the network
becomes non-functional. The model consists of selfish sensors
which act as sellers to provide the target localization data to a
Sensors
Service provider/
requester
Server/
platform
Mobile sensor/
fusion center
Area of 
interest
Access point/
base station
Server/
platform
Participants/
users
Area of 
interest
(a) (b)
Access point/
base station/
sink
Service provider/
requester
Fig. 7. Data aggregation using in (a) WSNs, and (b) crowdsensing networks.
fusion center, i.e., a buyer (an auctioneer). The fusion center
conducts the first-price sealed-bid reverse auction by soliciting
asks from the sellers. The sensors submit simultaneously
and confidentially to the fusion center their asks including
estimated values of data and the asking prices that they are
willing to be paid. In particular, the asking price of a sensor
reflects the remaining energy of the sensors, e.g., a high price
means that the remaining energy of the sensor depletes. Based
on the estimated values and the asking prices, the fusion center
defines its own utility function and selects an optimal subset
of sensors which maximize the utility function as the winners.
Since only the sensors with high energy, i.e., low asking
prices, are selected, the energy consumption balance and long
network lifetime are achieved. The simulation results showed
that the lifetime in terms of the time step at which the network
becomes non-functional of the proposed approach can achieve
up 25 while that of the popular strategy for sensor selection
based on the FIM (Fisher Information Matrix) [104] is around
15. However, the authors in this proposed approach did not
specify the unit of the time step.
The approach in [103] did not consider the QoS of sensing
data transfer. Thus, the authors in [105] adopted the sealed-
bid reverse auction to address the routing problem in WSNs
with the aim of minimizing the latency and maximizing the
network throughput for all applications. In fact, the latency
is also closely related to the energy efficiency since a data
packet with a large delay due to traveling more hops in the
network consumes more energy [106]. The model consists of
a router, i.e., a buyer, who selects one of its neighbors, i.e.,
sellers, as the next hop for the packet delivery. Accordingly,
each neighbor submits its ask including a path price which
reflects the estimated time delay of a route from the neighbor
to the destination. Generally, the path price of a neighbor
is a function of the number of hops from the neighbor to
the destination, the winning ask on the neighbor, and the
application priority. The router selects a neighbor with the
lowest path price as its next hop, i.e., the winner. The process
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is repeated on every hop and the minimal cost route is selected
on a hop-by-hop basis which leads to a path with an overall
minimal delay. Since each node always checks the path price
of its neighbors whether it is smaller than the current node, the
packet always moves towards the destination without routing
loops. The simulation results showed that compared with the
destination-sequenced distance vector algorithm in [107], the
proposed approach increases delivered packets while reducing
more the delay for damaged networks (up to 30% of damage).
However, for more highly damaged networks, the performance
difference between the two approaches is slight.
Value-based pricing: The reverse auction mentioned above
aims at maximizing the utility of the requesters. However,
due to the energy and capacity constraints of the sensors and
the wireless links, it is essential to determine the payment
expectation of the requesters and then adapt efficiently the
corresponding resource usage. Hence, value-based pricing is
suitable for this situation. Different from the reverse auction
which defines the lowest price among sellers, the value-based
pricing sets price primarily based on the perceived value to the
buyer rather than the cost of the product, the market price, or
even the historical prices. The authors in [106] employed the
value-based pricing to set the data selling price for the sensors,
i.e., sellers, according to the requirements of the requester, i.e.,
the buyer. The general model includes entities as shown in
Fig. 7(a), but there is an additional access point for pricing at
the requester’s side. The data selling price is set in two stages
at the sink and the access point. The sink sets the price based
on the expectations of the requesters about the data quality,
packet delay, and packet lifetime. The access point then uses
the price set by the sink along with the other requirements
of the requester to determine the maximum price that the
requester is willing to pay. The simulation results showed that
the proposed scheme improved significantly compared with
mobile ad-hoc schemes with respect to scalability, lifetime,
delay, delivery ratio, and price.
2) Data aggregation and routing in participatory sensing
and crowdsensing networks: Participatory sensing allows a
large number of users using mobile devices, e.g., smartphones
and tablets to gather sensing data from interest areas without
requiring the fixed and expensive infrastructure of WSNs
[108]. Similar to the participatory sensing, a crowdsensing
network stimulates ordinary citizens to contribute data which is
sensed or generated from their mobile devices [109]. However,
the crowdsensing network further explores the sensed data
from mobile Internet services, e.g., mobile social network
services, and heterogeneous crossspace. In other words, the
crowdsensing network is an extension of the participatory
sensing by aggregating the sensing data from mobile devices
and the user-contributed data from other data sources. Since
this paper considers the data collection from the mobile
devices, a common model can be used for both the two
paradigms. The common model is shown in Fig. 7(b) in which
the participants, i.e, users, using mobile phones to provide
their sensing data to the service providers, i.e., buyers, via
the servers or platforms. Since the sensing data contribution
requires the users to consume resources, e.g., energy and band-
width, a key challenge in the data aggregation is to provide
incentive to the users. There were some surveys discussing
incentive mechanisms in the participatory sensing, e.g., [110],
[111], [112], but they did not focus on economic issues. There-
fore, this section reviews economic-based approaches used in
the participatory sensing and the crowdsensing networks.
Sealed-bid reverse auction: In participatory sensing and
crowdsensing networks, the reverse auction mechanisms are
efficiently used in stimulating users to provide their sensing
data. Using the data aggregation model as shown in Fig. 7(b),
the server which acts as an auctioneer first broadcasts the
sensing task description from the requesters to all users, i.e.,
sellers. Users which are interested in the sensing task will
accept and perform the sensing task. Once completing the
sensing task, the users submit their asks including the sensed
data and the corresponding prices to the server. The server
selects a subset of them who own the lowest asking prices
and makes the payments to them.
To minimize the payment, i.e., incentive cost (asking price),
a high price competition between the users is always remained,
meaning that the number of users participating in the auction
needs to be large enough. The authors in [113] proposed a
Reverse Auction based Dynamic Price incentive mechanism
with Virtual Participation Credit (RADP-VPC) to achieve this
goal. The model is shown in Fig. 8 in which the users perform
the sensing task assigned by the requesters and provide the
sensing data to the requesters via the server. The proposed
approach consists of two functions: RADP and VPC. The
RADP employs the first-price sealed-bid reverse auction to
select the users with lowest asking prices as the winners.
The server will purchase the sensing data from the winners
and pay them rewards. Naturally, the losers in the current
round have no incentive to participate in the next round and
price competition will be decreased. As a result, in the next
round, the winners increase the asking price to gain their
utilities which may cause an incentive cost explosion. To tackle
this problem, the VPC mechanism is introduced. Accordingly,
loser i in the previous auction round r − 1 will receive an
amount of virtual credit αi when participating in the current
auction round r, as follows:
vri =
{
vr−1i + αi, if user i is lost in round r − 1,
0, otherwise,
where vri is the cumulative VPC. It will be used for decreasing
the asking price in current round as arci = a
ra
i − vri , where
arai is the actual ask which is claimed by user i and a
rc
i is
his competition ask. The server uses arci to select the winners
rather than arai , and thus the loser has more opportunities to
win in the current round. The simulation results showed that
using the VPC, the proposed strategy can reduce the incentive
cost up to 63% compared with the random selection based
fixed pricing mechanism in [114] while stabilizing this cost
over auction rounds.
However, in [113], the winners’ rewards may not be their
expectations and they drop out of the next round. This also
makes the asking price increase in the next round. To overcome
this problem, the authors in [115] introduced a participant
ReCruiting (RC) mechanism, in addition to the RADP-VPC.
The RC allows the server to broadcast the maximum price
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Fig. 8. Data aggregation using RADP-VPC.
paid to the winner in the previous auction rounds to the
dropped users. Like an invitation, the price information helps
the dropped users to re-evaluate their return-on-investment and
potentially rejoin in the next round. The simulation results
illustrated that the RADP-VPC with the RC dramatically
suppressed the auction price, thereby alleviating the pressure
on choosing the right value of VPC in [113].
The results in [115] can be improved if we determine the
satisfactory levels of the credit expectations for the dropped
out users. However, determining the expectation of the users
in advance is a challenge to the server since they may only
vote for satisfaction/dissatisfaction after getting the credit. To
deal with this problem, the authors in [116] employed the
exponential smoothing method which takes the most recent
payment history to predict the next expected credit from the
users. The simulation results showed that the total allocated
credit is close enough to the total required for the users with
a small tolerance of ±0.05. Nevertheless, this method cannot
be applied to users which have no previous payments.
Similar to [113], the authors in [117] argued that since all
participants contributed their data, all of them should be paid
rewards as incentives to execute the future tasks. However,
in this approach, monetary is used as rewards instead of the
VPC. In fact, the incentive cost can be reduced further if we
eliminate the winners which have too-closed locations since
their coverages can overlap with others. To select the subset
of the winners according to their locations (in additions to
the data price), the authors in [118] and [119] combined the
RADP-VPC scheme [113] with the Greedy Budgeted Maxi-
mum Coverage (GBMC) algorithm in [120] which guarantee
that the number of selected winners (thus the incentive cost)
is minimum while still achieving the same sensing coverage
as [113].
Sealed-bid multi-attribute reverse auction: By means
of the combination of RADP, VPC, and RC, the proposed
mechanism in [113] tackled two typical issues in reverse
auctions which are the cost explosion and the user dropping,
and thus it is more economically feasible. However, other
problems such as data quality (i.e., QoS) are not explicitly
addressed while not all sensing data have the same quality
[121]. Therefore, negotiating only on the data price is not
enough to meet data quality requirements of service providers.
Hence, the authors in [122] proposed a sealed-bid Multi-
Attribute reverse Auction (MAA) scheme to aggregate sensing
data with the aim of maximizing the servicer provider’s utility.
The MMA is a more complex form of the RADP by integrating
additional attributions of the sensing data, e.g., the data price,
the location accuracy, and the sensing time, into submitted
asks. These attributes have different weights and typically,
the price attribute has the largest weight since it is the most
important. Based on the attributes and the corresponding
weights, the service provider evaluates the utility score of
an ask submitted from a user. The users with highest utility
scores are selected as winners and get monetary for their
contributions. Compared with a typical reverse auction, e.g.,
RADP, the simulation results showed that the utility of the
MMA for the service provider is much higher, meaning that
the service provider gets more beneficial. The reason is that
the negotiation on more attributes brings more choices for
the service providers to maximize the utility for application
objectives. However, there exist some problems which were
not identified in this approach, e.g., how to weigh the attributes
and the privacy concerns of users when they submit their data.
Given the framework of MMA, the authors in [123] in-
vestigated the payment for users using coupons. Accordingly,
the coupons which allow the users to get discounts when
buying something in stores, restaurants, and so on, are used
as rewards instead of the real-money. A coupon itself contains
two monetary values: the internal value which is the amount
of money by redeeming the coupon, and the external value
which is determined by the valuation of each user for the
coupon. A user who wants to redeem its coupons can feed back
the service provider so that the service provider evaluates the
preference of the user and will suggest the coupons to a more
interested user in the next auction round. This guarantees that
the external value of coupon is always maintained at a high
level which reduces the incentive costs for the service provider.
Similarly, the authors in [124] used the coupons as rewards for
the user incentive. However, different from [123], the number
of coupons for a user is calculated according to its reputation
score using the trimmed-mean method [125] on the reliability
of disseminating data. Users with high reputation scores mean
a good participation history and get more coupons. However,
there are still some limitations when the coupons are used.
For example, from users’ perspective, the coupons are usually
less worth than money since money can be used universally.
In addition, it is difficult to evaluate the coupons with two
monetary values as defined above.
VCG reverse auction: Although the MMA scheme allows
a service provider to evaluate the asks based on different
attributes of data, the price is still the most important attribute.
However, the price suggested by users is private information
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and the service provider does not know the actual price which
may contain the energy and bandwidth costs. They often
declare higher costs than the actual one to earn more money.
To prevent such a misreport, the authors in [126] proposed a
VCG reverse auction scheme which formulates the Bayesian
game among the users, i.e., sellers. The VCG reverse auction
is a type of the sealed-bid auction of multiple items in which
the roles of the buyers and the sellers are reversed. The auction
scheme works in a socially optimal manner by charging each
seller who causes the harm of the social value to other sellers.
Accordingly, each user submits an ask including the sensing
costs and the participation level. In particular, the participation
level of a user here is the amount of data that the user
contributes. Assume that user i knows only its actual cost
ci and the probabilistic information about costs of the others
which can be denoted as c−i = (cj : j ∈ N, j 6= i), where N
is the number of participating users. The declared cost of user
i is determined to maximize his expected utility given by
Ec−i [ui(c)] = Ec−i [pi(c)− cixi(c)], (9)
where ui() is the utility function of user i with participation
level xi and payment pi, ci is the cost realization which is
determined according to the Bayesian game as follows. A
declared cost vector y∗ is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium if
for each user i ∈ N , we have
Ey∗−i [ui(y
∗
−i, y
∗
−i)] ≥ Ey−i [ui(y−i, y−i)], for all yi 6= y∗−i.
(10)
Equation (10) means that no user wants to change his cost
declaration strategy since this change will lead to a lower
utility.
Assume that ci, with i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, is defined. The service
provider selects a user i˜ = argmin
i
ciqi, where qi is the
quality indicator for user i which is computed based on the
data quality provided by the user in the past. The service
provider finally pays the winner the compensation defined by
the difference between the total cost of sensors j 6= i˜ when
the winner i˜ does not participate in the auction and the total
cost of sensors j 6= i˜ when the winner i˜ participates in the
auction. Although the proposed mechanism is optimal in the
sense of minimizing the compensation cost to participants, it
did not consider the similarity of device measurements which
leads to the potential data redundancies.
Posted price mechanism: As stated earlier, the posted
price mechanism is used in online procurement markets in
which sellers arrive in a sequential manner to offer their
goods. Therefore, this mechanism is feasible in continuous
crowdsensing applications where the phone users, i.e., sellers,
arrive in a sequential order, and asks cannot be solicited.
To make the posted price mechanism applicable, the authors
in [127] proposed a new framework based on the combination
of the posted price mechanism and an all-pay auction to
provide higher quality sensing data and guarantee the extensive
user participating under given budget constraints. The all-
pay auction is similar to the standard (winner pay) first-price
auction except that losers must also pay their bids [128]. In
the proposed approach, the roles of the buyers and the sellers
of the all-pay auction and the posted price mechanism are
reversed, i.e., the buyer sets the offer price instead of the
seller. The process of the proposed data aggregation model
is shown in Fig. 9(b) which is similar to that of a general
sealed-bid reverse auction as shown in Fig. 9(a). However,
the platform, i.e., the buyer, divides the task deadline and the
budget into several smaller periods and corresponding budgets.
The phone users, i.e., sellers, find their own suitable periods
and submit their sensing data to the platform. Based on the
sellers’ contributions and the allocated budget in each period,
the buyer determines the number of optimal winners in the
period using the all-pay auction and a threshold price for
the next period. Subsequently, when there is an arrival seller,
the seller compares its cost (for the task execution) with the
threshold price. If the cost is smaller than the threshold and
the budget in the period has not been exhausted, the seller
chooses to accept the data sensing task. The simulation results
implemented in [129] showed that when more budgets are
provided, the number of participants of the proposed solution
increases more quickly compared to the winner-take-all, in
which a single winner obtains all prizes. This result showed
the extensive participating of the proposed strategy.
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Fig. 9. (a) Sealed-bid reverse auction based data aggregation, and (b) posted
price mechanism based data aggregation.
Value-based pricing: To motivate the users, i.e., sellers,
to provide their sensing data and share their bandwidth,
the authors in [130] employed the value-based pricing to
determine the payment for the users based on the utilities,
e.g., the data quality and the timeliness, of the data that they
contribute. The model consists of two types of seller: helpers
who share their 3G connectivity or relay the data to the service
provider and source users who own data to upload. Once the
data is generated, an initial utility value is assigned to the data
which will decrease over time due to its freshness reduction.
The data can be uploaded to the service provider, i.e., the
buyer, by either the helpers or the source if the source has the
3G connectivity. The service provider calculates an amount of
credits for the helpers and the source according to the freshness
and the quality of the data. To measure the motivation level
of the users, a delivery rate which is defined as the amount of
data uploaded to the server over the amount of data generated
was introduced. The simulation results showed that the success
rate of the proposed solution can achieve up to 70% while that
of the First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS) policy [131] is around
55%. However, it is difficult to evaluate the rate in the real
world since it may need several months of data. The same
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approach can be found in [132], but the number of credits for
the sellers is calculated according to more attributes of the
sensing data including the location information, starting time,
sensing frequency, expiry time and kind of data.
Demand and supply model: Demand and supply model
is used to allow sellers to adjust price of goods according to
buyers’ demands to reach the market equilibrium. The authors
in [133] modeled the sensing data bit allocation problem as the
demand and supply model in which a fusion center is buyer,
and sensors are sellers. However, different from a traditional
demand and supply model, the buyer adjusts the price instead
of the seller. The fusion center first broadcasts a price vector to
purchase sensing data bits from sensors. Given the price vector,
sensors find the demand vector to determine their production
plans which maximize their profits. If the demand amount
is less than the supply one, the price is decreased, and vice
versa. The price update process continues until the market
equilibrium is reached where the data bits supplied by the
sensors meet the fusion center’s demand. Since the sensing
data produced by sensors is always close to that of the fusion
center’s demand, the resources are used efficiently. However,
as indicated in [134], the equilibrium may not be stable and
the computational cost for converging to the equilibrium can
be high.
Bargaining: Before being uploaded to the server, the data
can be filtered by participants to guarantee that the data sent
to the server is not redundant. Thus, the participants may
employ the bargaining model to exchange their data before
uploading as proposed in [135]. The model consists of two
selfish participants, i.e., sellers, who provide their data to the
server, i.e., the buyer. Based on the probability of successful
data delivery to the server, the sellers weigh all of their data
and exchange their data lists to learn data that the participant
1 does not have but the participant 2 has, and vice versa. From
each other’s list, the participants 1 and 2 exchange the equal
weight data from high to low by using a greedy algorithm.
After exchanging, the expected credit reward Rmi (r) is used
by participant 1 to anticipate the reward of trading message
m of type r with participant 2, and is defined by
Rm1 (r) = A
m
1 (r)p1(r),
where Am1 (r) denotes the appraisal of the message m. A
m
1 (r)
indicates the probability that only the participant 1 delivers
this message to the server, i.e., the probability that all other
participants have not delivered the message m. p1(r) is the
probability of participant 1 to meet the server at the first
time. The simulation results showed that the bargaining-based
scheme achieves more fairness while incurring less com-
munication overhead compared with the direct transmission
schemes. However, as the number of participants increases,
the scheme may require a large number of exchange messages
among them.
Bargaining was also adopted in traffic prediction systems
providing the data negotiation among participants and the
server, e.g., [136] and [137]. In this model, the roles of the
participants and the server can be buyers or sellers. In [136],
drivers who participate on a route desire to get the road traffic
information from others via the server. The server will only
provide this information to the participants who upload their
sensing data. The participants will get more information if they
upload higher quality data which allows the server to predict
the traffic situation more accurately. To distinguish the quality
of the data, two attributes of data are considered which are the
data update speed and the route where the data update comes
from. For example, if the data is updated more frequently from
a participant, then the data value from the participant would
be greater than others’. The experiment results showed that the
proposed mechanism could improve the prediction accuracy of
traffic prediction up to 80%, and thus reducing significantly
traffic congestions. However, the obtained result also requires
a large number of participants.
The same approach was found in [137] which aims at max-
imizing the total amount of collection data and their quality.
However, this approach studied more about the fairness of
incentive distributions among participants. The fairness reflects
the relationship between each participant’s data contribution
and its received service quota for future data consumptions.
In other words, extra rewards are given to participants with
more contributions. An optimization problem was formulated
to achieve the maximum fairness which is measured by the
Jain’s index [138] for all participants. However, this work did
not provide specific attributes to evaluate the data updated
from the participants which can prevent some participants
from executing future tasks due to the insufficient payments.
A stricter data exchange protocol was developed in [139]
in which a participant cannot download data directly from
the server or indirectly from other participants if it did not
perform data uploads to the server. Therefore, the participants
are motivated to get information from the server by uploading
sensing data or sharing their bandwidth with other participants.
Nevertheless, this approach was not verified by experiments.
Apart from the common schemes described above, others
economic models have also been applied to the data collection
in the participatory sensing including:
Multi-objective Knapsack problem: The previous data
collection approaches like RADP-VPC or MMA allow the
service provider to select users with the lowest payment.
However, when the allocated budget is constrained, the number
of selected users is strict. To guarantee the QoS of the service
provider with a limited number of users, the multi-objective
Knapsack problem can be used. Based on this theory, the
authors in [96] modeled the selection of participants as a
multi-objective optimization problem which aims at achieving
the high quality data with the low payment. The model
consists of a service provider, i.e., a buyer, who needs to
select strictly a limited number of participants, i.e., sellers,
to provide the sensing data. The participants are selected
according to the knapsack problem formulation as presented
in Section III-C2 where the weight constraint is the limited
number of participants while the high data quality and the
low payment are the objectives of the optimization problem.
In the case that the number of selected participants is not equal
to the weight constraint, a criterion of crowding distance in
[140] which measures the distance from a participant to its
neighbors can be taken to add or eliminate the participants.
For example, if the number of selected participants is more
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than the weight constraint, some participants with the smallest
crowding distance can be eliminated. The experiment results
showed that the proposed scheme outperforms the auction-
based strategies, e.g., RADP-VPC [113], in terms of the ratio
of the total data quality to the total payment. It means that
although the RADP-VPC scheme has the smallest payment, it
provides a very low quality data, which makes it difficult for
the service provider to ensure the QoS.
B. Opportunistic Transmission and Neighbor Discovery
In the previous section, we discussed the applications of
economic and pricing models to attract phone users in aggre-
gating sensing data with high quality at low cost. The majority
of sensing data is then sent to the server through single-hop
3G/4G cellular networks. However, due to limitations such as
3G/4G costs and cellular capacity, the cellular networks would
not be economically feasible. Therefore, the opportunistic net-
working can be adopted to achieve the minimum transmission
costs, maximum energy efficiency, and minimum traffic.
Such a scheme can be found in [141] and [142] in com-
bining with the cost-based pricing to minimize the global
system cost. Cost-based pricing is a strategy to set the price
of a product based on costs to produce the product. The
model in [141] is shown in Fig. 10 which consists of a
source phone user, i.e., a seller, selling its sensed data to a
server, i.e., a buyer, through the 3G cellular radio or the WiFi
routers nearby or its neighboring users. First, the source builds
a one-hop neighbor table including the available neighbors
and corresponding relay costs. The source then considers the
costs as its input to calculate its profit and select a neighbor
that has the minimal input cost for the data relay. Since the
cost using the short-range communication (via neighbors or
WiFi routers) is much lower than the 3G/4G connectivity,
the proposed approach encourages the seller to transmit its
data to neighbors using the short-range communication. The
simulation results illustrated that the global system cost can
be arbitrarily close to the minimal according to the Lyapunov
optimization theory. However, these results are only reachable
if the system parameter which is multiplied by the total
monetary value of the data to determine the data selling price
is sufficiently small.
Similarly, the authors in [142] adopted the cost-based pric-
ing to compute the packet delivery cost from the source sensor
to the sink via mobile devices. In this model, there are two
types of relay nodes: integrated relays which act as traditional
wireless relays and courier nodes. To save resources, critical
packets are relayed by the integrated relays while less critical
packets can be forwarded by a courier depending on its
forwarding charge with respect to the packet’s threshold price.
Each courier node decides on its forwarding price based on
the delivery time, buffer capacity, and the remaining energy.
Depending on the criticalness of data, the source selects a
courier node with low forwarding price so that its profit is
maximized. Since the forwarding price is inversely propor-
tional to the availability of resources, the proposed delivery
scheme achieves high efficiency in terms of energy, cost and
delivery rate. For example, at pause time of 500 seconds,
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Fig. 10. Opportunistic transmission based on cost pricing.
the average consumption energy can be saved up to 40%
compared with the traditional MANET delivery protocols, e.g.,
Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol [143].
However, in the proposed approach, the authors did not define
the threshold price which allows the source to decide whether
to forward the packet to the courier or to directly transmit it.
In practice, an adaptive control of the "sparsity level"
in compressed sensing [101] for the data aggregation can
be combined with this opportunistic transmission strategy,
which will achieve the minimum transmission costs, maximum
energy efficiency, and minimum traffic. Therefore, the use of
appropriate economic and pricing model in jointly designing
the data aggregation with the opportunistic transmission is
of great importance, which seems to not be studied before.
This is a kind of future research direction to come up with
such a nice economic and pricing model for joint design and
optimization towards adaptive control of "sparsity factor" in
the compressed sensing based data fusion, considering the
channel/path conditions, subject to the QoS of the IoT services.
C. Relay Selection
To meet the QoS requirements, the source node needs to
choose optimal routes (e.g., the shortest route and the least-
energy consumption route) for its data forwarding. However,
nodes on the different routes are typically rational and selfish,
thus pricing strategies can be employed as incentive mecha-
nisms for the nodes to forward the sensing data.
1) First-price sealed-bid reverse auction: Similar to the
data aggregation, the sealed-bid reverse auction schemes are
also applied efficiently to solve the relay selection problem.
As described in [144], the scheme was introduced for the
relay node selection with the aim of decreasing the energy
consumption and prolonging the network lifetime. The model
is illustrated in Fig. 11 in which the whole forwarding process
can be implemented by multiple stages. Each stage consists of
one buyer, i.e., a source node, who buys the data forwarding
service from several sellers, i.e., neighbor nodes. Since the
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APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR DATA AGGREGATION AND ROUTING
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[103]
Sealed-bid
reverse auction
Selfish
sensors
Fusion
center
Target
localization
data
Sellers submit to the auctioneer their ask values
inversely proportional to the remaining energy, the
auctioneer selects an optimal subset of sellers
with the lowest ask values
Energy consumption
balance, and buyer’s
utility maximization
Nash
equilibrium
[105]
Sealed-bid
reverse auction
Neighboring
sensors Router
Packet
forwarding
service
Sellers submit to the buyer their asks including
the path price, the buyer selects a seller with the
lowest path price
Overall minimal delay,
and network throughput
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
[106]
Value-based
pricing
The sink
node Requester
Packet
forwarding
service
Seller sets prices according to the requester’s
requirements to maximize the utility of the
requester
Buyer’s utility
maximization
Value
optimization
[113]
Sealed-bid
reverse auction
Phone
users Server
Sensing
data
Sellers submit their asking prices including the
task execution costs to the buyer, the buyer selects
a subset of sellers with the lowest asking prices
and gives them rewards. The losers also get
virtual credit for incentive
Service quality
guarantee, incentive
cost minimization,
improved fairness, and
social welfare
improvement
Nash
equilibrium
[115]
Sealed-bid
reverse auction
Phone
users Server
Sensing
data
Same as [113] but the buyer adds a recruiting
mechanism to stimulate the dropped users to join
in the future
Service quality
guarantee, incentive
cost minimization,
improved fairness, and
social welfare
improvement
Nash
equilibrium
[117]
Sealed-bid
reverse auction
Phone
users Server
Sensing
data
Same as [113] but the buyer pays the users by
monetary instead of the virtual credit Incentive improvement
Nash
equilibrium
[118]
[119]
Sealed-bid
reverse auction
Phone
users Server
Sensing
data
Sellers submit their asks including costs and their
locations. The buyer selects a subset of the
winners based on the GBMC algorithm
High data quality, area
coverage improvement,
and incentive cost
minimization
Nash
equilibrium
[122]
[123]
Sealed-bid
multi-attribute
reverse auction
Phone
users
Service
provider
Sensing
data
Sellers submit their asks including multiple
attributes. The buyer calculates the utility scores
based on the attributes and selects a subset of the
users with highest utility scores
Utility maximization Bayes-Nashequilibrium
[126]
Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves reverse
auction
Phone
users
Service
provider
Sensing
data
A Bayesian game among sellers is introduced.
Sellers submit their asks including the costs and
data contributions to maximize their utilities. The
buyer selects a user as the winner depending on
the cost and a data quality indicator
Individually rational,
and
incentive-compatible
Bayesian
Nash
equilibrium
[127]
[129]
Posted price
mechanism
Phone
users Platform
Sensing
data
Sellers compare their costs and a threshold price
set by the buyer to decide to perform the tasks.
They submit the sensing data to the buyer and get
rewards
High data quality, and
extensive participation
improvement
Nash
equilibrium
[130]
[132]
Value-based
pricing
Phone
users
Service
provider
Sensing
data and
relay
service
Seller sets prices according to the service
provider’s requirements to maximize the utility of
the requester
High transmission
success rate, and utility
maximization
Value
optimization
[133]
Demand and
supply model Sensors
Fusion
center
Sensing
data
Buyer adjusts iteratively the price of data so that
its data demand matches with the data supply of
sellers
Resources efficiency Marketequilibrium
[135]
Bargaining
game
Two
phone
users
Server Sensingdata
Two sellers exchange their data with each other
by using a greedy algorithm to provide the
non-overlapped data to the buyer
Overhead and delay
reduction, and fairness
Pareto
efficiency
[136]
[137]
Bargaining
game
Phone
users Server
Sensing
data and
road traffic
information
Sellers provide their sensing data to the buyer.
The buyer pays the sellers for the road traffic
information
Fairness, utility
maximization, and
prediction accuracy
improvement of traffic
Pareto
efficiency
[96]
Multi-objective
Knapsack
problem
Phone
users
Service
provider
Sensing
data
Buyer employs a pairwise tournament selection
approach to select a set of optimal sellers which
maximize high data quality and minimize the
payment
Fairness, utility
maximization, and
prediction accuracy
improvement of traffic
Pareto
efficiency
stages have the same relay selection process, we only consider
the relay selection in the first stage. The source node builds its
own table containing information of the link quality and the
residual energy of neighbors. The link quality is a function
of the residual energy and the hop count of the neighboring
node (to the sink node). Different from the typical sealed-
bid reverse auction where only the neighbors (sellers) submit
their asks, in this approach, both the source node and the
neighbors submit their asking prices at the same time. The
asking price of a neighbor is a function of the hop count,
the link quality and the service price that is willing to get
from the source. The asking price of the source is an average
price calculated based on the information in its table. The
source will buy the relay service from a neighbor at the deal
price of the neighbor if its asking price is smaller the asking
price of the source. In case of multiple selected neighbors,
the source chooses the one with the lowest asking price. The
simulation experiment showed that the proposed algorithm
outperforms the Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy
(LEACH) protocol [145] in terms of energy consumption. This
is because of the single-hop communication strategy of the
LEACH protocol.
2) Dutch reverse auction: Another auction scheme which
can be used for the relay selection strategy is the Dutch
reverse auction. In this scheme, the seller initially asks a
high price and then lowers the price at each iteration until
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Fig. 11. Auction-based relay selection mechanism.
the buyer accepts the price. Similar to the first-price sealed-
bid reverse auction, a seller in the Dutch reverse auction has
no bidding information of the others and the winner gets a
payment that is equal to his asking price. Such approach for
the relay selection was proposed in [146] where the model
is used similarly to [144]. Accordingly, the source acts as a
buyer who purchases the relay service from one of the relay
nodes, i.e., sellers. However, instead of asking the relay nodes
to suggest their asking prices as in the first-price sealed-bid
reverse auction, the source provides forwarding regions with
different priorities as the asking-price, i.e., the initial hint, via
the request-to-send frame of the request-to-send/clear-to-send
handshake. The priority of a region is defined according to the
advance that the node forwards to the destination. It means
that the regions which are closest to the destination have the
highest priority. Each relay node determines independently
and autonomously its priority to build its own ask. They then
respond to the source sequentially according to the priority via
the clear-to-send frame. The relay node with the first arrival
clear-to-send frame is selected as the winner for the data
forwarding. The simulation results showed that the proposed
strategy achieved the stable packet delivery success ratio up to
90% while this ratio of the scheduled relay selection is around
70%.
3) Stackelberg game: Auction approaches allow the source
to select the best neighbor for its data forwarding. However,
there may be rational interactions between the nodes. For
example, the selected relay node just accepts to transmit part
of the packet instead of the whole packet from the source, and
thus the whole packet should be divided into different parts.
However, the splitting strategy depends on the independent
decisions of the relay nodes rather than the source. Therefore,
the authors in [147] modeled the relay selection problem
as a hierarchical game, i.e., a two-stage Stackelberg game
between the source, i.e., the buyer, and the relay nodes, i.e.,
sellers. Accordingly, the relay nodes act as leaders and they
first set their own relay prices. Then, the source, i.e., the
follower, selects the corresponding splitting strategy, i.e., the
flow configuration, to maximize its utility. Given the source’s
splitting strategy, the leaders then may re-determine the prices
with the aim of maximizing their own utilities. It was proved
that the utility functions of the follower and the leaders are
convex, and thus there exists a unique solution for the flow
configuration and the relay pricing which is the Stackelberg
equilibrium outcome of the game [148]. The simulation results
verified that the outcome of the Stackelberg game achieves the
best utilities among all Nash equilibrium strategies which are
obtained by assuming a simultaneous choice for leaders and
the follower. Moreover, compared with the Nash equilibrium
strategies, the Stackelberg strategy achieved a more balanced
energy dissipation among the relay nodes since the relays
make price announcements taking into account not only the
competition, but also the battery reserve capacity.
D. Congestion Management
When multiple sources transmit simultaneously the data
to the sink node, the congestion may occur at the relay
nodes. This congestion level increases network delays and
decreases the value of information. Traditional congestion
control techniques which often employed the destination-to-
source feedback scheme, e.g., [149], are not applicable in
WSNs since the flow paths can change before the feedback
loop can be formed. Therefore, dynamic pricing strategies
are considered as appropriate solutions for the congestion
management in WSNs.
1) Second-price sealed-bid auction: An auction may be
conducted at congested nodes to prioritize the sensing data
forwarding. The authors in [150] employed the second-price
sealed-bid auction for the congestion management in which
the congested node acts as an auctioneer, i.e., a seller, and
the packets act as bidders, i.e., buyers. The bidders compete
with each other for the current transmission slot and the
auction may be repeated until the congestion is removed. The
reason for using the second-price sealed-bid auction is that the
winner only gets the current transmission slot instead of the
entire resources as the first-price sealed-bid auction. Consider
a target tracking application, each packet contains the target
information, e.g., the target velocity, the application priority,
and a delay from the source to the sink node. However, since
the auction is conducted at the congested node, not the sink,
an approximate value of the delay is used instead. Specifically,
the value is taken from the previous auction round. The value
of the packet is evaluated in terms of loss of information
utility. The auctioneer selects a packet with the highest loss of
information utility as the winner of the current transmission
slot. The losers also get an additional fund for the future
auction rounds which is proportional to their information loss
incurred due to its transmission delay. This enables equalizing
the information utility loss according to the different target
tracking applications and also minimizing the total utility
loss in the network. The simulation results indicated that the
difference in utility losses between the proposed solution and
the analytical congestion management approach is small on
average across all the tracking applications. The auction-based
congestion management, by extension, was used in directional
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binary sensor networks to provide the additionally directional
information of the target [151] or to provide the congestion
information for the source nodes in the path selection [152].
In particular for the path selection application, the winning bid
values in the auctions to resolve the congestion on the next
hops can be included in the path price as discussed in [105].
Therefore, this helps the source node to dynamically obtain
the path with the smallest predicted utility loss.
The auction used in [150], [151], and [152] can be consid-
ered as a static auction since each congested node executes the
auction based only on its local information and does not take
the auction information about other nodes into account. This
can make the congested node evaluate the loss of information
utility of the packet (i.e., bid) incorrectly. For example, if
the packet has not passed the congested node yet, the node
does not approximate the time delay, meaning that the loss of
information utility cannot be evaluated exactly. To allow the
congested node to make more efficient decisions, the authors
in [153] introduced a traveling auction scheme in which a
node can share its local auction information with its neighbors.
The traveling auction is similar to the auction scheme in [150]
with the addition of the information sharing mechanism among
nodes in the network. The shared information is added to the
packet header which includes the application ID, the time at
which the packet is generated as well as the delay. However,
increasing the overhead messages also affects the traffic in the
network.
Apart from the above congestion management, the second-
price sealed-bid auction was also adopted in the data queue
management for priority deviation problem in delay-tolerant
WSNs [154]. Accordingly, data packets are scheduled for
transmitting based on their priorities. To distinguish the pri-
ority of data and avoid the collision due to data priority
deviations, each packet is associated with the price which is
a function of three parameters, i.e., priority dimension which
identifies the network class, priority class which shows the
priority order of each data group, and priority measure to
quantify the priority value of each data group. The data packets
in the queues will be prioritized based on their prices and
the higher-price data packets will be sent first. Compared
with the direct data transmission schemes, the simulation
results indicated that the proposed approach achieves a better
performance in terms of the data delivery ratio. However, high
complexity of computing the priority for each price can result
in increasing average delay of the network.
2) Value-based pricing: The value-based pricing can be
also employed for the packet dropping strategy at the con-
gested node as proposed in [155]. However, in this approach,
the buyer sets the price instead of the seller. Specifically, the
sink, i.e., the buyer, sets prices for packets receiving from
sensors, i.e., sellers, depending on which the sink is willing to
pay and then notifies the sensors these prices. The packets with
higher prices are expected to contain more important informa-
tion, and the sink prefers to buy such important information.
Therefore, when the congestion arises at the sink, the packets
with higher prices are selected. However, to guarantee the
fairness for all packets and the coverage fidelity of the whole
network, the Jain’s fairness index [156] was introduced which
allows to determine the accepting probability of each packet
with the aim of maximizing the relatively fair opportunity to all
packets. Since the accepting probability, i.e., the accumulated
survival probability, contains information of the price and the
coverage fidelity, it is considered as a decision variable which
the sink uses to select or drop the packets. The simulation
results showed that the throughput of the proposed scheme is
much higher than that of the First-In First-Out (FIFO) policy,
especially when the network congestion occurs.
Apart from the pricing models used above, the authors
in [157] adopted a term called node price to address the
congestion control and the energy consumption minimization.
Specifically, each packet sent from the source to the sink is
associated with a node price which is defined as the total
number of transmission attempts across the network before
a successful packet is delivered to the sink. The node price
reflects the communication cost, i.e., the consumed energy
to successfully deliver a packet from each source to the
sink. When the congestion arises at the sink node, it directs
individual sensors to increase or decrease their reporting rates
depending on their communication costs so that the energy
consumption of the WSN is minimized while alleviating the
congestion. However, in dense networks, it is difficult to send
the control information to every node since the sink can be at
distance from the sensors.
Summary: The reviewed papers in this section have shown
clearly the efficiency of the economic and pricing models for
the problems related to the data exchange and the topology
formation. We summarize the issues along with references in
Table II for the data aggregation and Table III for the topology
formation. From these tables, we observe that many works
investigated the data aggregation problem while the topology
formation problem was less studied. For the data aggregation,
auctions are considered as the most efficient pricing models
in stimulating users to contribute high quality data at low
incentive cost. The next section discusses the use of economic
and pricing models for sensing resource and task allocation.
V. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR RESOURCE AND TASK ALLOCATION
As aforementioned, WSNs are very limited by resources.
The resources include the available energy, wireless band-
width, and computational resources (e.g., processing capa-
bility, storage capacity, and battery power). Therefore, the
resource usage optimization in WSNs has become a critical
issue. In this section, we review the use of economic and
pricing models for the following issues:
• Resource allocation: Traditional resource allocation al-
gorithms often assume that the available resources in a
system such as network bandwidth do not change. How-
ever, the amount of available resources on the devices
and the communication channel in WSNs is not constant.
Pricing mechanisms are used as solutions in which all of
WSN’s scarce resources, e.g., CPU, storage, bandwidth,
and battery, can be best utilized with the variability of
resource budget.
• Energy Control: The energy consumption of the sources
are reserved for sensing, processing and communication.
20
TABLE III
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR DATA AGGREGATION AND ROUTING
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
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sm
is
si
on
[141]
Cost-based
pricing
Source
phone
user
Server Sensing data
Seller updates costs from their neighbors for
forwarding the sensing data to the buyer. The
best neighbor is chosen to maximize the
seller’s profit
Throughput optimality,
global costs
minimization, and
self-organization
Pareto
optimum
[142]
Cost-based
pricing
Relay
nodes
Source
sensor
Packet
delivery
Sellers set their forwarding prices which are
inversely proportional to the availability of
resources
Energy consumption
minimization, and high
reliability
Pareto
optimum
R
el
ay
se
le
ct
io
n [144]
First-price
sealed-bid
reverse auction
Neighboring
sensors
Source
node
Data relay
service
Sellers submit their asking prices which is a
function of hop count, link quality. Buyer
selects a seller with lowest price as the winner
Energy consumption
minimization, and
network lifetime
enhancement
Nash
equilibrium
[146]
Dutch reverse
auction
Relay
nodes
Source
sensor
Data relay
service
Buyer sends the different prices corresponding
to their forwarding regions to sellers. A seller
will relay the data if it accepts the offer price
Energy consumption
reduction, and high
reliability
Nash
equilibrium
[147]
Stackelberg
game
Relay
nodes
Source
sensor
Data relay
service
Sellers set their relay prices. The buyer selects
corresponding data splitting strategy so that its
utility is maximized
Utility maximization of
sellers, and energy
consumption reduction
Stackelberg
equilibrium
C
on
ge
st
io
n
m
an
ag
em
en
t
[150]
[151]
[152]
Second-price
sealed-bid
auction
Congested
sensor Packets
Current
transmission
slot
Buyers submit their bids including the loss of
information utility. The seller selects a buyer
with the highest loss of information utility as
the winner
Information utility loss
balance, and total
utility loss
minimization
Nash
equilibrium
[153]
Second-price
sealed-bid
auction
Congested
sensor Packets
Current
transmission
slot
Same as [150] but the sharing information
scheme between the congested sensors is
introduced
Information utility loss
balance, and total
utility loss
minimization
Nash
equilibrium
[154]
Second-price
sealed-bid
auction
Congested
sensor Packets
Transmission
slots
Buyers submit their bids including priority
parameters. The seller assigns the transmission
slots to higher-price packets
High packet delivery
ratio, and average delay
reduction
Nash
equilibrium
[155]
Value-based
pricing Sensors
Sink
node
Sensing
information
The buyer sets price for each packet depending
on which it is willing to pay. When the
congestion arises at the sink, the packets with
higher prices are selected
Throughput
maximization,
information utility
maximization, and
fairness
Value
optimization
[157]
Value-based
pricing Sensors
Sink
node
Sensing
information
Each seller set a node price on each its packet
which is the function of the previous
unsuccessful attempts. The buyer adjusts the
reporting rate of the sellers depending on the
price
Network lifetime
maximization, and
reliability maintenance
Value
optimization
Pricing strategies based on the utility are employed to
stabilize and optimize the transmit power level for sen-
sors.
• Task allocation: Task allocation is to assign sensing tasks
to specific sensors in the network for execution. Given the
constrained resource and distributed structure of WSNs,
the goal of the task allocation scheme is to achieve a fair
energy balance among the sensors while minimizing the
delay. To address this problem, price formulations can be
used as they can continuously adapt to changes of the
resource availabilities.
A. Resource Allocation
Resource allocation in WSNs is to assign the network
resources, e.g., time slot, communication bandwidth, and
energy, to sensors for performing their tasks. In traditional
resource management, resources are assigned to the sensors
in a static manner. Such system resource management is
inefficient since the demand and supply of the resources do
not usually match [74]. Market-enabled pricing schemes can
alleviate the inefficiency by creating an artificial market for
exchanging dynamically the resources between the sensors.
1) Combinatorial auction: The aforementioned auction
schemes are based on a single-item auction mechanism in
which individual items are auctioned independently. However,
in many cases, using multiple items may yield a higher
utility than using each of them separately, i.e., the items
are complementary. For example, in moving target tracking
applications, using measurement data from multiple sensors
increases the tracking accuracy. Therefore, instead of using
the single-item auctions, we can use combinatorial auction
schemes which allow consumers, i.e., buyers, to request a
complete bundle of auction items.
[158] is an example in which the combinatorial auction was
adopted for the resource allocation problem in WSNs through
proposing a market architecture. The model is shown in Fig. 12
where the sensor manager acts as an auctioneer. Individual
sensors and transmission channels are represented as sellers to
provide goods, e.g., area scans, and target tracks, consumed
by goods requesters, i.e., buyers. First, the buyers submit
their bids to the auctioneer involving a task description, e.g.,
the minimum task quality. Completing this task requires the
combination of resources from the sensors and communication
bandwidth. For each task in the consumers’ bids, the sensor
manager enumerates the possible allocations and uses the price
quotes included in these bids to evaluate the clearing price for
each allocation. Evaluating the allocation can be performed via
an iterative procedure called tatonnement process depending
on the current usage rate and the availability of the resource,
as described in [159]. For finding the winner of the auction,
unlike the auction schemes mentioned earlier, e.g., sealed-bid
auctions, the winner determination of the combinatorial auc-
tion in [159] is actually to find an optimal resource allocation.
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Due to computational complexity, different approaches were
proposed for the winner determination.
Finished goods
(e.g., Target tracks)
Consumers
(Buyers)
Sellers
Sensors (own 
sensor resources)
Transmission 
channels
(own bandwidth)
Sensor manager 
(Auctioneer)
BidsMarket
reports
Consume
Produce
Schedule
Fig. 12. Market based architecture for multiple resource allocation.
One of the winner determination approaches can be found
in [160] in which the authors employed an anytime combi-
natorial search algorithm called CABOB. The approach finds
a resource allocation so as to maximize the revenue of the
auctioneer under the constraint in which each item, i.e., a
resource, can be allocated to at most one bidder. Generally, by
using a modified depth-first search on the space of possible
bids, the CABOB is considered as one of the fastest exact
winner determination algorithms. However, its complexity
grows exponentially with the number of items and may not
be applicable with a large number of bids (i.e., combinations
of resources) to be allocated. Therefore, the authors in [161]
proposed a new algorithm called Seeded Genetic Algorithm
(SGA) which has polynomial time complexity in the number
of bids. The SGA is a ranking-based representation scheme
which is a combination of the genetic algorithm and a bid-
ranking scheme with the purpose of producing only feasible
allocations and finding high quality solutions quickly. The
simulation results indicated that compared with the informa-
tion theoretic sensor manager algorithm in [162], the proposed
solution in [161] achieves better resource allocation in terms of
more number of destroyed targets. Although these results are
promising, they only use a naive implementation of seeding.
Investigating more sophisticated mechanisms that adds incen-
tive compatible measures to approximate winner determination
algorithms needs to be considered.
2) Double auction: The scheme discussed in Section V-A1
aims at allocating the resources to different sensors, each of
which executes an individual task. For multifunction sensor
(e.g., multifunction MEMS (Micro-Electro-Mechanical Sys-
tems) sensors) which can perform multiple tasks, executing
a task is assigned a resource. However, since the demanded
resources and the supplied resources for a task may not be
equal, it is essential to exchange the resources between the
tasks with the aim of maximizing the global performance.
Accordingly, each task must determine how much the amount
of allocated resources will be used. If there are some residual
resources, the task can resell them to other tasks such that
its benefit is maximized. Since a task may act as a resource
buyer and a resource seller simultaneously, the double-sided
auction can be used to allow multiple sellers and buyers to
exchange their resources by submitting their asks and their
bids to an auctioneer. The asks from sellers and the bids from
buyers form the supply and demand curves, respectively as
shown in Fig. 13(a). The x-axis denotes the amount of supplied
resources and y-axis denotes the ask or the bid prices. For
example, on the supply curve, a seller asks to sell Qa1 units
of resources at price Pa1 (i.e., Bid 2) while on the demand
curve, a buyer bids to buy Qb2 units of resources at price
Pb2 (i.e., Ask 1), and so on. It can be seen that Fig. 13(a) is
actually a discretized form of the supply and demand model
which is shown in Fig. 13(b). The intersection point of the
supply and demand curves is the supply-demand equilibrium,
i.e., the market equilibrium [163].
Following this model, the authors in [164] proposed the
Continuous Double Auction Parameter Selection (CDAPS)
scheme in which sensor tasks represented by agents exchange
their resources via the double auction scheme. At any time,
each agent submits a bid to buy and an ask to sell resources.
The auctioneer decides a valid transaction for the resource
exchange at which there exists the largest ask price pa and
the lowest bid price pb with pa > pb, the transaction price,
i.e., a clearing price, p is set as p = (pb + pa)/2. From
Fig. 13(a), pa and pb are Pa4 and Pb4, respectively. The buyer
obtains resources while the sellers receive payments according
to the auction rules. This process is repeated to match each
remaining pair of a buyer and a seller and define corresponding
clearing prices. Theoretically, there exist multiple clearing
prices. However, the auctioneer often selects one of them
as the clearing price to avoid the complexity of the auction
process. The competitive market equilibrium obtained by this
auction scheme satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
which guarantees that the algorithm converges to the optimal
solution. With the target tracking resource allocation model
described by Van Keuk [165], the simulation results demon-
strated that the performance in terms of mean track utility of
the CDAPS has a significant improvement over conventional
rule based methods since it converges to the global optimum
allocation. However, similar to the data allocation approach
based on the supply and demand model in [133], the global
optimum allocation may not be stable.
3) Non-cooperative game for auctions: The auction mecha-
nisms are often used when the bidding strategies are unknown
to the bidders. When the bidders have knowledge of bidding
information of the others, a non-cooperative game can be
used to determine a resource allocation equilibrium among the
bidders [166]. The authors in [167] adopted the game model
for the resource allocation between the players which are sub-
applications or agents with different priorities. The function of
each sub-application is to manage a task sequence, purchase
resources from a resource sensor and assign the resource to
its current task. When multiple agents simultaneously access
the resources, a bidding process is conducted on the resource
sensor to decide how to partition the resources. Accordingly,
each agent submits its bid including the price that the agent
is willing to pay. To determine how to bid for an agent, it is
assumed that the payments of all other agents are constant, and
each agent has knowledge of bidding strategy of other agents.
The objective of the agent is to decide an optimal bidding
strategy, i.e., a payment, to minimize its current task’s exe-
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Fig. 13. (a) Discrete supply and demand curves of double auction, and (b) continuous supply and demand curves from economics.
cution time, constrained by its expenditure budget. The set of
optimal bidding strategies yields a unique Nash equilibrium for
resource allocation among interested agents at which no agent
can gain an advantage by deviating its own payment strategy
unilaterally [168]. However, in a real market environment, one
agent cannot know how much others would like to pay for the
resource since the agents have private information and do not
reveal their strategies. Therefore, a more efficient allocation
algorithm named Bayesian Nash equilibrium allocation can
be studied.
4) Demand and supply model: Demand and supply model
is used to determine a market equilibrium which can also
be obtained via the double auction scheme as discussed in
Section V-A2. The authors in [169] adopted the demand
and supply model for a rate allocation algorithm in wireless
multimedia sensor networks. The model consists of a rate
allocator which acts as a seller to assign the bit rate to the
data sending sensors, i.e., buyers. Accordingly, in a time slot,
the allocator broadcasts an initial resource price which can
be taken from the previous time slot. Based on the price,
each sending sensor calculates a resource demand with the aim
of maximizing its average utility [170]. If the total resource
demand is not equal to the total resource supply, the allocator
adjusts the price depending on the difference between them.
The new price is announced to the sensors to recalculate
their resource demand. This process is iterated until the total
resource demand equals the total resource supply, i.e., a
resource allocation equilibrium. Typically, several iterations of
the price and demand messages would be exchanged between
the allocator and the sensors, and thus the convergence speed
is affected. However, as indicated in [171], the allocation
equilibrium can be obtained with only a single iteration by
introducing a delay buffer with the size corresponding to the
actual time delay. Accordingly, the delay buffer will store
any extra bid rate from the sensor which is drained during
those periods until the total resource demand is less than the
total resource supply. The performance of the rate allocation
algorithm was measured by the data quality in terms of peak-
to-noise ratio. The simulation results showed that the peak
signal-to-noise ratio of the proposed approach is much higher
than that of the constant rate allocation [172] which lacks any
knowledge about the future demand.
5) Smart data pricing: The smart data pricing is employed
to make users aware of high cost when consuming bandwidth
during the peak demand periods. Adopting this policy to the
WSNs, the authors in [173] investigated a congestion price
function at each relay sensor for the flow control, i.e., to man-
age the data transmission rate. Similar to the relay selection
problem, the model here consists of a source, i.e., a buyer,
which buys the data relay service from its neighboring sensors,
i.e., sellers. There is a price regulation scheme at neighbors
depending on the size of the forwarding data required by the
source. When the source sends the data with a large size to a
neighbor, the service price for the data relay increases. With
the strategy of minimizing the cost function, the source will
re-split the data traffic by adjusting the traffic at each neighbor
which leads to a load balance among the neighbors. In addition
to the load balance, a resource balance among the sensors is
also achieved if the available resource, e.g., energy, is taken
into account in the price function.
6) Utility function: This scheme aims at optimizing the
resource allocation for each sensor through maximizing utility
functions. Such approach often uses the NUM framework, i.e.,
the NUM problem, associated with the method of Lagrange
multipliers with their interpretation of resource prices as de-
scribed in Section III-C1. The authors in [174] proposed a rate
allocation algorithm in WSNs by using the NUM framework.
Each source sensor is associated with a concave utility function
depending on the source’s transmission rate. Such concavity
of the utility functions is to guarantee that the NUM problem
has a unique optimal solution. Since the utility functions are
known only to the sources, the NUM problem is decomposed
into two optimization problems as defined similar to those
in (6) and (7). The Lagrange multipliers are adopted with
their interpretations as rates and resource prices that the source
sensors are willing to pay. It was then proved that there always
exists a unique optimal solution for the rates and the resource
prices. The proposed algorithm was then implemented under
a dynamic network where different sensors turn on and off
at various time. The results showed that for each new state,
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the algorithm can immediately adapt to the dynamic of the
system.
The rate allocation algorithm in [174] is only for uni-
cast flows, meaning that each source transmits its data to
a single sink. When multiple sinks consume data from the
same source, i.e., multicast flows, the NUM framework needs
to be modified. The authors in [175] extended the typical
NUM framework to a more general WSN environment where
individual sinks derive their utilities from a set of sources
and intermediate nodes which use the link-layer multicast
transmit scheme to forward data to multiple sinks. Based on
the concavity property of utility function, each source sensor
iteratively adapts its rate to reach an optimal solution.
Both [174] and [175] use the gradient ascent method to
find the optimal solution. Due to a small and constant step
size, the convergence is slow. To achieve the optimal rates
more quickly, the authors in [176] analyzed factors which have
influences on the convergence speed. One of the critical factors
is the step size which determines the magnitude of increase
or decrease in rate at each iteration. If the value of step size
is larger, the convergence of an algorithm is faster. However
this also gives a rise to oscillations in system. Therefore, the
step size needs to be set to guarantee the fast convergence and
the stability. For this, the authors considered two methods to
calculate the step size. The first method is Newton’s method
based on first-and second-order derivatives to compute the
optimality of the objective function. The Newton’s method
is considered as a popular alternative to the gradient-approach
because of its fast convergence. However, the convergences
are not guaranteed if selecting an initial guess is too far from
the exact root. The second method employs an Additive In-
crease Multiplicative Decrease (AIMD) [177] which takes into
account the congestion level along the source’s flow to sink
nodes. Through evaluating the performance in terms of the
utility versus time, the AIMD approach improves significantly
the convergence speed compared with the Newton’s method,
especially in the dynamic environment (e.g., with frequent
parameter changes in sources).
In fact, there is always an inherent trade-off between the
transmit rate and the consumed energy, e.g., a higher data
rate requires greater sensing and transmit power. While the
WSNs are energy-constrained, the energy allocation and the
data transmission rate on each sensor are always considered
together. Therefore, the authors in [178] and [179] proposed
a joint power control and rate adaptation scheme for WSNs
through using the NUM framework. The model can be illus-
trated by a simple example as shown in Fig. 14 in which the
source sensor s1 transmits its collected data to the sink node
via relay sensors s2 and s3. Accordingly, the sensors, i.e., the
source and the relay sensors, should allocate their relay power
ratios properly so that the transmission of relaying traffic is
guaranteed while still adjusting their data transmit rates so as
to prolong their lifetime. Similar to [175], the optimal solution
for the power ratios and the transmit rates can be obtained
via the NUM framework under the constraints of channel
capacity and total energy consumed for relaying the collected
data. By associating the NUM problem with the Lagrangian
in which Lagrangian multipliers are the price per unit rate
and the price per unit power/energy that a sensor needs to
pay to the network, it was proved that there exists a unique
solution for the rate and the power allocation. The simulation
results illustrated that compared with the MaxUtility algorithm
in [180] which purely seeks for the utility maximization, the
proposed algorithm requires less power for each link while
achieving the better data rates.
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Fig. 14. An example of sensing data relay.
The same approach could be found in [181]. However, the
authors in [181] considered more about the utility-lifetime
tradeoff in WSNs by introducing of a weight between the
rate and the consumed energy into the utility function of
each sensor. The simulation results indicated that as the
weight increases from 0 to 1, the total utility of the net-
work also increases while the network lifetime decreases.
The mechanism thus allows adjusting the weight according
to the actual requirements and makes the network behave at
a desired performance, i.e., utility maximization or lifetime
maximization.
Similar to [178], the authors in [182] studied the source
rate optimization scheme taking into account the saturation of
channel usage and energy consumption. However, the scheme
is applied in heterogeneous sensor networks with several
available routes or paths between the source and the sink
node, i.e., the multipath routing. The goal is to adapt the
path rates (and hence source rate) to maximize the utility
achieved by each sensor. The authors introduced two price
vectors associated with links (which is part of one path or
route) and sensors. At each link, a link algorithm is executed
to update the link price depending on the saturation of channel
usage: if the aggregate path rate at a link exceeds the channel
capacity, the link price will be increased. Similarly, each sensor
updates its node price depending on the energy depletion.
In particular, if energy consumption at a sensor exceeds the
maximum energy allowed, the node price will be increased,
and decreased otherwise. Both the link algorithm and node
algorithm are iterative. Given these two prices, each source
adopts the first-order Lagrangian algorithm to adapt its path
rates and then calculate the source rate which is the sum of
all path rates. It was also indicated that at the steady state, the
source rate allocation of sensors is utility max-min fair and
the global fairness is achieved.
B. Task Allocation
In WSNs, task allocation schemes aim at assigning tasks
(e.g., target track and area scan) to specific sensors for execu-
tion. Given limited resources of WSNs, static task assignment
24
schemes may not meet an objective due to the lack of inter-
actions between the elements of the network. Therefore, the
dynamic task allocation schemes with negotiation mechanisms
among elements in the network were developed to optimize the
task allocation and resource utilization. This section reviews
different approaches based on market models.
1) First-price sealed-bid auction: The authors in [183]
designed a task allocation scheme by employing the first-price
sealed-bid auction, called the Rust-In-Time (JIT) market. The
task allocation problem is modeled as a multi-agent nego-
tiation including: sensor agents, i.e., sellers, which perform
tasks, external systems known as buyers who may require data
from the sensor network, a market entity, i.e., an auctioneer,
to assign tasks to sensors, and resource agents to provide
resources for sensors. First, buyers submit their bids including
task requests and corresponding prices to the auctioneer. Then,
these bids are broadcast to the sellers. Given the offered
bid, each seller calculates its own utility based on its current
capabilities to determine whether it can perform the task. If
the sensor can perform the task, the task will be assigned
accordingly. The auctioneer may terminate the auction to avoid
the delay for real-time applications. This negotiation protocol
provides the dynamic adaptation to network changes. However,
the function of the auctioneer is only to broadcast the bids to
the sellers, and thus this entity can be removed to reduce the
system complexity.
As indicated in [184], instead of having a dedicated entity
for an auctioneer, the seller (also the auctioneer) is a sensor
selling its task that it cannot accomplish (e.g., due to the
limited energy), to its neighboring sensors, i.e., buyers, who
can perform the task. The seller first broadcasts the assigned
task to the buyers and then based on the remaining energy, the
buyers determine and submit the bid prices to the seller. The
seller will select a winning buyer if the buyer’s bidding price
is higher than a predefined threshold. Similar to [183], to get
the highest bidding price, the seller waits for a deadline which
is set according to the application requirement to decide the
winner. Since the price is proportional to the remaining energy,
the proposed strategy maintains the energy balance among the
sensors in the network. Performance analysis showed a good
balance obtained at the threshold of 0.6, but the authors did
not indicate how to obtain this value.
In fact, the sensing data is only useful to the auctioneer
when the sensors are far enough from each other. Similar to
[118], the authors in [185] considered the distance among the
sellers in a participatory sensing when assigning a task. The
task allocation is modeled as the first-price sealed-bid auction
in which the service aggregator, i.e., auctioneer, assigns the
sensing task to more than one user, i.e., buyer. The buyers
submit their sealed bids simultaneously to the auctioneer. To
represent the conflict among buyers, the auctioneer uses graph
composed of a set of vertices and a set of edges. Each vertex
represents a buyer in the graph, and there is an edge between
a pair of buyers, if their geographic distance is smaller than
a threshold value. The auctioneer then allocates the task to
the buyers using the best known maximum independent set
approximation algorithm for general bounded degree graphs
[186] so that the buyers who are connected in graph are
not allocated the task concurrently. Therefore, the proposed
solution achieves an allocation efficiency as high as the best
ever known maximum independent set algorithm in addition
to the strategy-proofness property. In some cases, the users
arrive sequentially in the geographic area, online auctions are
efficient alternatives for the the sealed-bid auction.
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Fig. 15. The multiple interactions among the three elements in the stages.
2) First-price sealed-bid reverse auction: This section dis-
cusses task allocation schemes based on the sealed-bid auction
mechanism as described in Section V-B1, but the roles of the
buyers and the sellers are reversed. The objective of the reverse
auction is to achieve a fair energy balance among sensors
[187], [188] or high data quality [189]. The model in [187]
consists of an allocator acting as a buyer (or an auctioneer) and
sensors (sellers) performing the required tasks. Accordingly,
once receiving a required task from a buyer, the auctioneer
broadcasts the task description (e.g., size and deadline of the
task) to all sellers. Each seller calculates its own asking price
for completing the task based on its current status of available
energy, communication cost, task deadline and resource release
time. In particular, the asking price is inversely proportional
to the energy level. In particular, the seller who has higher
remaining energy has the lowest asking price, and thus it
may have more opportunities to be selected. To determine a
seller with lowest asking price, i.e., the winner, centralized
or distributed schemes can be executed. The former requires
all sellers to submit their asking prices simultaneously, and
the seller with the lowest price is selected for executing the
task. In the distributed scheme, each seller sets a waiting time
value in proportion to its calculated price. The seller with
the lowest price, i.e., the shortest waiting time, submits its
asking price to the buyer before any other sellers, and it
is selected as the winner. Other sellers receiving a winner
determining message from the buyer will leave the auction
without sending their asks to the buyer. The objective is to
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reduce the communication overhead and energy consumption
for sending the non-winning messages to the buyer. However,
the non-winning sensors still consume energy to listen to
the winner determining message. Therefore, the authors in
[188] added waiting time reduction phase which allows the
sellers to compare their asking prices with a broadcast budget
value from the buyer. If the bidder’s asking price exceeds the
budget, that bidder leaves the competition and switches sleep
mode without waiting for the winner determining message.
The simulation results indicated that the reverse auction based
scheme balances the remaining energy for all the sensors
and lowers the energy consumption compared with the static
task allocation method, e.g., Energy Balance-Critical Node
Path Tree (EB-CNPT) [190]. However, the task allocation
approaches in [187] or [188] aims to enhance the performance
of independent applications.
In the context of mobile crowdsensing, the authors in [189]
employed the reverse auction scheme to assign tasks to users.
This scenario has three entities: 1) the task requester who
posts a sensing task and acts as a buyer, 2) users, i.e., sellers,
and 3) the server, i.e., the auctioneer, which is responsible
for participant selection, task price evaluation, and payment
mediation. The interactions among three entities are shown
in Fig. 15 which involve four stages: task publishment, task
assignment, winner selection, and payment mediation. Briefly,
when the requester publishes the sensing task description, the
server evaluates the task price according to its sensing region
and sensing period. For example, when a task within a region
is easy to be executed, its value (i.e., price) is low and vice
versa, if the task within a square is difficult to be performed,
which implies a high task value. This value is then sent back
to the requester for suggesting a budget. Based on the budget,
the requester selects phone users who satisfy the budgetary
constraints and best match the requested sensing context for
the task. The selected phone users then submit their asks for
the requested sensing task, and the server selects the winner
based on their asking price and reputation. In particular, the
reputation of a phone user is a reflection of the quality about
the historical sensed data that the phone user submitted to the
server. Both winner and losers receive reward, and moreover
reputation of the winner is updated based on its historical data
submissions. Although experiments showed that the proposed
mechanism obtains a dynamic budget, optimal task allocation
and high motivation for phone users to participate, the factors
that have impact on phone user participation, such as user
preference and privacy protection have been not considered.
To tackle this problem, the authors in [191] investigated the
payment scheme to provide satisfying reward to the phone
users. Accordingly, each seller is paid an amount of reward
which is the highest asking price that the seller can submit to
win the auction while contributing to the profit of the server.
However, submitting the asking price which reflects the true
costs of performing a task to the requester may be challenging
in real world settings. Indeed, the users may typically not
reveal their true costs to get more reward or the costs may
be difficult to determine. Instead of soliciting the users’ costs,
the authors in [192] proposed to use the posted price model
based on the link between the reverse auctions and the multi-
armed bandits [193] which allows participants to express their
reservation prices plus a profit. The selected winners are re-
warded with an amount computed by a k-armed bandit system
instead of their original bid prices as mentioned in [191].
The idea behind this mechanism is to learn the reservation
price curve for each participant. The prices are discretized
by creating a set of k price arms, and at each time step, the
mechanism picks an arm based on some optimization criteria
and user feedbacks, i.e., accept or reject the offer. After several
time steps, the mechanism may use a policy that balances the
exploitation, e.g., greedy policy, and the exploration to reach
a maximum average reward. The mechanism continues until
the budget is exhausted. Theoretical analysis showed that the
proposed approach is budget feasible and incentive compatible
(truthful). Moreover, the requester achieves a near-optimal
utility. However, running the proposed mechanism in real time
on crowdsourcing platforms to confirm these properties is still
open for future studies.
3) Double auction: Compared with the single-sided auc-
tion schemes, double auction is more suitable for resource
allocation problems with fairness and allocation efficiency
[194]. Indeed, in traditional one-to-many single-sided auction
style, e.g., forward or reverse auctions, the centralized control
belongs to the seller or the buyer who has the rights to
establish the rule of transactions. This results in the collusion
or the market manipulation problem. In the double auction
procedure, both groups of the buyers and the sellers lose their
relative dominant positions, and their relationship follows the
supply and demand theory as described in Section V-A2.
The authors in [195] proposed a strategy-proof (i.e., truthful-
ness) double auction for the sensing task scheduling in mobile
participatory sensing systems. In this model, multiple sensing
tasks from users which act as buyers will compete for the
sensing times (i.e., items) from a large number of smartphone
users, i.e., sellers. Also, the smartphone users compete to sell
the sensing times to the sensing tasks. A trustworthy server
that resides in the cloud acts as an auctioneer in this model.
Each sensing task submits its bid including sensing time price
and the sensing time demand to the server. At the same time,
each smartphone submits its ask involving the sensing time
price per unit and the limited sensing time. The server then
sorts the smartphone users in a non-decreasing order by the
bid prices and the sensing tasks in a non-increasing order by
the ask prices. Then, the server finds the largest indexes of bid
and ask prices in these two sets at which the first smartphone
has sufficient sensing time to satisfy the demands of the first
sensing task without losing any profit in the auction. The
winners will be the first smartphone user and the first sensing
task. The authors also proved theoretically that the given
mechanism is strategy-proof since it possesses the property of
individual-rationality and incentive-compatibility. The evalua-
tion results indicated that the social welfare obtained with this
algorithm linearly increases with the number of smartphone
users and the number of sensing tasks. However, to adapt to
the dynamic change of the number of crowdsourcing tasks
and smartphones, the use of online double auctions is open
for further study.
In [196], the authors also adopted double auction, but they
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Fig. 16. Double auction based task allocation in crowdsourcing system.
considered a crowdsourcing system as illustrated in Fig. 16.
The task requesters act as buyers who purchase the sensed
data, i.e., items, from the users, i.e., sellers. In addition to the
strategy-proof property, another economic property with ex-
post budget balance is considered. A double auction is ex-post
budget balance if the auctioneer’s utility is no less than zero.
Basically, the stages, i.e., the asks and bids sorting procedure,
the task requesters and smartphone users matching procedure,
are implemented similarly to those in [195]. However, to
maintain the ex-post budget balance, in the payment stage,
the secondary price clearing rule of the second-price auction
scheme is employed. Accordingly, the auctioneer, i.e., the
server, pays each winning smartphone user by the bid of
losing user with the highest bid and charges each winning
task demander via the use of the uniform bidding price. The
simulation results showed that for a given number of users,
both the charge for task requesters and the payment to smart-
phone users are increased when the number of task requesters
increases, thus improving the ex-post budget balance of the
auction.
4) Combinatorial reverse auction: For multiple concurrent
applications in sensor networks (e.g., temperature monitoring,
security alarms, and light control), some common tasks across
different applications can be shared to reduce the deployment
and administrative costs, and increase the usability and effi-
ciency of resources. However, the problem is how to identify
the common tasks. If we consider a combination of the tasks is
a bundle of items, a combinatorial auction is a suitable mecha-
nism to identify the best bundle of items. The authors in [197]
addressed the task allocation and sharing in multi-application
WSNs via the reverse combinatorial auction. The model is
illustrated in Fig. 17, where the sensors are either bidders or
resource sellers, and the auctioneer is an intermediate entity to
distribute task messages from the application manager. Each
application may consist of several tasks such as target surveil-
lance, target positioning, and data acquisition. The objective is
to maximize the network lifetime by sharing tasks and network
resources between applications while improving the overall
QoS of each application. Accordingly, after receiving a task
message from the auctioneer, the sensors calculate and submit
their asks including cost values for subsets of the applications’
tasks in terms of available resources, e.g., energy and CPU
cycle.
Since the combinatorial reverse auction problem is a NP-
complete, a heuristic two-phase Winner Determination Proto-
col (WDP) was proposed. The first phase employs a local
decision making strategy to eliminate the number of asks
with lower probability of winning. This reduces the message
exchange overhead, the energy consumption, and the delay
for winner determination. In the second phase, the suboptimal
subsets are selected through an ordering heuristic algorithm as
proposed in [198]. Simulations were implemented to evaluate
the system efficiency and scalability when the number of
concurrent applications and network size increase. The results
illustrated that there is a significant difference in terms of
energy consumption when the tasks are shared compared with
the non-sharing case. Moreover, the proposed task allocation
scheme outperforms the static task allocation method in [190],
i.e., EB-CNPT, in balancing the energy in the network since
the energy availability is considered in each epoch of the task
allocation.
In the centralized WDP used in [197], sensors are required
to submit their asks simultaneously. This increases overhead of
message exchanges with high energy consumption. Therefore,
the authors in [199] introduced the Energy and Delay Effi-
cient Distributed Winner Determination Protocol (ED-WDP).
Through the use of bid formation, ED-WDP reduces the
message exchange overhead, energy consumption, and delay
for the winner determination compared to the WDP.
Different from [197], the authors in [200] adopted a com-
binatorial auction for the task allocation with the aim of
balancing the energy consumption among sensors. Specifically,
when an object enters the field of view of a sensor, due to
the energy depletion, the sensor, i.e., the seller, may sell the
object tracking task to its neighboring sensors, i.e., buyers,
through the combinatorial auction. Each neighboring sensor
calculates its bid value which is a function of a bundle of
attributes like the signal strength, the remaining resources, and
the distance between the target and the neighboring sensor. In
particular, the bid value of a neighboring sensor is high if
its remaining resources are high and the distance is short.
Among the neighbors, the seller selects a sensor with the
highest bid value as the winner to perform the task. Through
simulations, it was shown that the proposed approach achieves
better energy balance among the sensors comparing with the
static and random task schedules. However, the scenario used
in the proposed approach is simple with a static object. In a
dynamic environment with the movement of the object, more
tracking tasks are required to be assigned to the sensors.
5) Option pricing: For the task allocation problem, when
an auctioneer accepts multiple task requests while there are
limited sensors to perform, it needs to determine the values
of the tasks for scheduling purpose. Evaluating the tasks can
be implemented by auctions such as the first-price sealed-bid
auction as mentioned in Section V-B1. Accordingly, the value
of a task is determined based on auction bids which is also
known as a market price of the task [201]. However, due to
the variability of the value as well as the number of bids, the
market price may not indicate the actual value of the task.
Therefore, options pricing models based on the real option
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Fig. 17. Market based architecture for multiple task allocation.
theory can be used to offer a robust method for task valuation
and scheduling by considering the time value of a dynamic
task and the risk involved in the selection of an option for the
requested task. Such options may include whether to abandon
a task (put), delay a task, and/or schedule a task (call). The
most common model used to determine the price, i.e., the
strike price, of an option, is the Black-Scholes model as shown
in (1). The authors in [58] investigated a fuzzy real option
approach for determining the market price of a sensor task
for the task schedule. The approach called fuzzy cognitive
map is a combination of the option theory and a fuzzy logic.
Accordingly, the strike price is determined using the Black-
Sholes pricing formula in (1). In this case, the traditional
financial variables, e.g., the price of the underlying security
and the exercise price, are substituted by the mission variables,
e.g., task priority and task duration, via the fuzzy logic. The
obtained strike price for a task is then used to decide whether
a particular task is for the sensing task schedule. Nevertheless,
experiment evaluations were not given in [58].
6) Discrimination pricing: For the price discrimination
scheme, the price of the same product is set differently at
different time. Therefore, it can be used for managing resource
demands through adjusting the resource price per unit at
different time. In [202], the authors employed this scheme for
allocating resources to execute tasks in visual sensor networks.
The resource allocation problem is modeled as a multi-agent
system in which the resource providers, i.e., sellers, sell
resources and communication links to the tasks, i.e., buyers.
Since the resource demand of the tasks strongly depends on
the price of resource, two pricing models are considered.
The first one, called "adjusted linear pricing", updates the
resource price per unit based on the average of interest level
(i.e., willingness to pay) of executed tasks and the number
of allocated/requested resources. The second one, called "rate
adaptive pricing", adjusts the resource price per unit in the
next time slot based on the price set in the "adjusted linear
pricing" phase and the current allocation rate (i.e., allocation
level). The updated price is then used to control the behaviors
of resource utilization of the tasks. Through adjusting the
price for resources depending on their supply and demand
relation, it was shown that the QoS level of the executed tasks
is adapted efficiently according to the user-defined interest
levels. However, simulation results for different scenarios with
different interest level distributions did not show in this work.
Moreover, non-linear price functions need to be considered in
the first pricing model.
Summary: In this section, we have identified two ma-
jor issues in sensing networks and reviewed applications of
economic and pricing models for these issues (i.e., resource
allocation and task allocation). We summarize the issues along
with references in Table IV for the resource allocation and
Table V for the task allocation. From the two tables, we
observe that the resource allocation are mainly solved by
the utility function-based pricing model while for the task
allocation problem, the first-price sealed-bid auction is widely
used. Sensing coverage and target tracking are other impor-
tant issues in the development of sensing networks. In the
following section, we review the existing literature on pricing
models-based sensing coverage and target tracking strategies
in WSNs.
VI. APPLICATIONS OF PRICING MODELS FOR SENSING
COVERAGE AND TARGET TRACKING
Sensing coverage is an important metric in many WSNs.
It measures how well the sensors observe the physical phe-
nomenon in an environment where they are deployed. A
number of works studied and developed schemes to maximize
the sensing coverage [203]. Classical approaches are based
on centralized structure that can provide globally optimal
solutions given resource constraints. However, they suffer from
high computation cost and communication overhead, e.g.,
O(n3) for the Hungarian method [204], where n is the number
of sensors. More importantly, the centralized schemes have a
serious scalability issue. Thus, market based solutions, e.g.,
auction, were proposed, which are shown to achieve similar
results to the optimal solutions. However, the computation cost
is significantly reduced. Three types of sensing coverage are
typically considered [203].
• Area coverage: Area coverage measures the area of
sensing field that is covered, i.e., the collection of all
space points within the sensing field. Static sensors can
be deployed. Then, the uncovered area will be healed by
selecting appropriate mobile sensors via pricing models.
• Target coverage: Target coverage mainly deals with how
to cover a set of discrete targets (some space points)
given known locations. The requirement is to increase the
sensing range of each sensor to cover interested targets.
However, energy consumption is a critical constraint, and
pricing models can be applied to address this problem.
• Barrier coverage: Barrier coverage concerns finding a
penetration path across a sensor field with the aim of
detecting any intruders that attempt to cross the field.
In this case, using pricing mechanisms may address key
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TABLE IV
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR RESOURCE AND POWER ALLOCATION
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
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[158]
[159]
[161]
Combinatorial
auction
Individual
sensors and
transmission
channels
Consumers
Area scans
and target
tracks
Buyers submit their bids to the auctioneer
including task requirements. The auctioneer
enumerates all possible resource allocations and
find an optimal solution as the winner
QoS guarantee, and
resource usage
optimization
Optional
solution
[164]
Double
auction Sensor tasks
Sensor
tasks Resources
Buyers and sellers submit respectively their bids
and asks to buy and sell the resources. The
auctioneer decides the valid transaction for the
resource exchange according to the
supply-demand theory
Global optimum
allocation
Market
equilibrium
[167]
[168]
Non-
cooperative
game
Resource
node
Sub-
applications Resources
Buyers submit their bid prices to the seller, and
their strategies are to optimize theirs payments.
The set of optimal bidding strategies yields a
unique Nash equilibrium for resource allocation
among interested buyers
Payment optimization
of buyers, and
efficient and balanced
resource allocation
Nash
equilibrium
[169]
[171]
Demand and
supply model
Rate
allocator
Data
sending
sensors
Data rate
Buyers adjust their demands according to the
prices from the seller. This process is iterated
until total demand equals total supply which
yields the marker clearing price
Data quality
improvement
Market
equilibrium
[173]
Smart data
pricing
Neighboring
sensors
Source
sensor
Transmission
rate
Each seller builds own congestion price function
of the data traffic size. When the source node
sends the data with large size, the charge for the
data forward is high
Load balancing Marketequilibrium
[174]
[175]
Utility
function Network
Source
sensors
Transmission
rate
Each buyer is associated with a concave utility
function depending on its transmission rate and
price per unit flow it must pay. Based on the
NUM framework, a unique optimal solution for
rate and price is determined
Optimal and
proportionally-fair
rate allocation
Optimal
solution
[176]
Utility
function Network
Source
sensors
Transmission
rate
Same as [174] but the Newton’s method and
AIMD are introduced to improve the algorithm’s
convergence
Optimal and
proportionally-fair
rate allocation,
convergence and
stability improvement
Optimal
solution
[178]
[179]
Utility
function
Network and
relay sensors
Source
sensors
Transmission
rate and
energy
Same as [174] but the price per unit energy is
included in the utility function in addition to the
price per unit flow
Optimal rate and
energy allocation
Optimal
solution
[181]
Utility
function
Network and
relay sensors
Source
sensors
Transmission
rate and
energy
Same as [178] but a weight between the
allocated rate and the allocated energy is
included in the utility function
Optimal
utility-energy tradeoff
Optimal
solution
[182]
Utility
function Network
Source
sensors
Transmission
rate
Same as [181] but the saturation of channel
usage and energy consumption of routes in
networks are introduced
Rate optimization,
energy consumption
balance, and utility
max-min fairness for
resource allocation
Optimal
solution
challenges of the barrier coverage, e.g, scalability and
energy consumption.
A. Area Coverage
The authors in [205] addressed the area coverage problem
by using the sealed-bid auction. The sensing area is covered
partly by static sensors. To cover the rest of area, mobile
sensors can be used. Specifically, the static sensor as a buyer
buys the service from mobile sensor as a seller to move
and perform sensing tasks in the uncovered area. The static
sensors detect their local coverage holes by using Voronoi
diagrams as in [206]. Accordingly, every static sensor forms a
Voronoi polygon with respect to the position of its neighboring
sensors as shown in Fig. 18. The part of the polygon that lies
outside its sensing range (i.e., disk coverage zone centered at
the sensor) is not covered by the sensor. Typically, a static
sensor chooses the farthest vertex in its Voronoi polygon as
the target location of the coming mobile sensor. For example
in Fig. 18, the location which needs to be healed for the sensor
S1 is the vertex A. This is to avoid overlapping the coverage
area between the static sensor and the mobile sensor and
thus to guarantee that the achievable coverage is the highest.
After that the static sensors calculate their bid prices based
on the estimated sizes of the holes they detect. The mobile
sensors also calculate their own base prices based on the sizes
of coverage holes formed at their current positions in the
case that the mobile sensors decide to leave these positions.
After receiving the bid prices from the static sensors, each
mobile sensor decides to move to cover the hole if the highest
price has a coverage hole size greater than the new hole size
(i.e., base price) generated in its current location due to its
movement. The accepted bid price will become the new base
price of the mobile sensor. The bidding protocol repeats until
no static sensor can give a bid price higher than the base
price of any mobile sensor. Performance evaluation indicated
that compared to the sensor random deployment algorithm,
i.e., all sensors are static and VEC algorithm [206], i.e., all
sensors are mobile, the proposed algorithm can significantly
reduce the number of sensors required to reach a certain
coverage requirement. For example, when 10% of the sensors
are mobile, the required number of sensors is reduced by 30%.
Although the approach in [205] achieves a high cover-
age, mobile sensors may consume much energy due to the
iterative movement. This is because the mobile sensors do
not know the largest hole beforehand. This problem can be
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TABLE V
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR TASK ALLOCATION
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
Ta
sk
al
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[183]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Sensor Externalsystems Task
Buyers submit bid prices, the seller accepts a
task with the highest price
Utility maximization
of seller
Competitive
equilibrium
[184]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Sensor Neighboringnodes Task
Same as [183] but the seller accepts a task from
the first arrival bid Energy balance
Competitive
equilibrium
[185]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Aggregator Phoneusers Sensing task
Buyers submit their bids. The auctioneer assigns
the task to the buyers using the best known
maximum independent set approximation
algorithm for general bounded degree graphs
Allocation efficiency
and strategy-proof
Competitive
equilibrium
[187]
[188]
First-price
sealed-bid
reverse
auction
Sensors Allocator Task Sellers submit their asking prices. The task isassigned to a seller with the lowest asking price Energy balance
Nash
equilibrium
[189]
First-price
sealed-bid
reverse
auction
Phone
users
Task
requester Sensing task
Same as [187] but the task is assigned to a seller
with the low asking price and high reputation High data quality
Nash
equilibrium
[191]
First-price
sealed-bid
reverse
auction
Phone
users Server Sensing data
Sellers submit their asks to the server to perform
a subset of tasks, the buyer selects the sellers
who are most likely to increase its profit by
using the solution of a linear programming
High data quality,
individual rationality,
computational
efficiency, and
truthfulness
Optimal
solution
[195]
Double
auction
Phone
users
Sensing
tasks
Multiple
sensing times
Sellers and buyers, respectively, submit their
asking prices and biding prices. Matching a
buyer and a seller is based on the strategy-proof
double rule
Good performance
with social welfare
and task satisfaction
ratio
Market
equilibrium
[196]
Double
auction Requesters
Phone
users Sensed data
Same as [195] but a payment stage based on the
secondary price clearing is added
Maximized revenue
of the winning buyers
Market
equilibrium
[197]
[199]
Combinatorial
reverse
auction
Sensors Sensor
A subset of
applications’
tasks
Sellers submit their asking prices. An ordering
heuristic algorithm is employed to select the
winner owning a subset of tasks which has the
lowest price and covers the entire applications
Network lifetime
maximization, and
overall QoS
enhancement
Optimal
solution
[200]
Combinatorial
auction Sensor
Neighboring
sensors
A target
tracking task
Buyers submit their bundles including remaining
resources, distances between them and the target.
The seller selects a buyer with the highest bundle
value as the winner
Network lifetime
maximization
Optimal
solution
[58]
Options
pricing
Task re-
questers Sensor Tasks
Black-Sholes pricing formula and a fuzzy logic
are employed Effective schedule
Real value
of task
[202]
Price
discrimination
Resource
providers Tasks
Resources
and commu-
nication
links
Resource price is adjusted according to the
willingness to pay of buyers through an
exponential running average
Resource utilization
maximization, and
QoS level adaptation
Pareto
efficiency
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Fig. 18. Illustration of using Voronoi diagram to detect a coverage hole and
decide the hole size.
solved by using so-called virtual movement or logical move-
ment strategy. Instead of moving physically in each round,
the mobile sensors perform virtual movements, i.e., logical
movements, to the logical locations. After several rounds of
bidding, they determine and move to their final destinations.
This approach reduces the overall movement distance, but
increases the message overheads between the sensors. Thus, a
proxy-based bidding protocol proposed in [207] adopted in
the virtual movement strategy to improve the performance
in terms of energy efficiency. Each mobile sensor considers
a static sensor as its proxy when the mobile sensor accepts
the bid from this static sensor. After that, the proxy sensor
emulates the virtual movement for this mobile sensor and
bids for new destinations in the next round. The proxy may
delegate its proxy role to another static sensor with a higher
bid in the next round. Therefore, the virtual movement is
actually performed by delegating the role of proxies between
the stationary sensors. Simulation results in [208] showed that
the proxy-based approach can save up to 50% of moving
distance and thus reduce significantly the energy consumption
while achieving the same coverage as that proposed in [205].
However, in both [205] and [207], the authors did not consider
the energy consumption balances of all of the sensors, so the
lifetime of the network may be short.
B. Target Coverage
Assume that a sensing target is static. The target coverage
problem aims to cover all targets by adjusting the sensing
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range of each sensor as shown in Fig. 19. However, when
sensors increase their sensing ranges, there are constraints such
as energy consumption and sensing overlap. If we assume
that each sensor has its utility which is a function of its
sensing range, an appropriate model to determine sensors’
sensing ranges is the NUM framework as described in Section
V-A6. The NUM framework is suitable since it formulates
the problem by maximizing the aggregate utilities of sensors
subject to the constraints. In [209], the NUM framework for
determining the sensing range of sensors was proposed to
address the target coverage in WSNs. Each utility function
in this approach is logarithmically concave function of the
sensing range. Therefore, the NUM problem has a strictly
concave objective function. However, this is solvable only if
the network has complete knowledge of all sensors’ utility
functions. In [209], the problem was formulated with the
the Lagrange multipliers with their interpretations as resource
prices and overlapping prices. In particular, the resource prices
are the energy prices which sensors are willing to pay. Using
the gradient ascent algorithm, it was then proved that the
two price variables converge to a unique solution. Simulation
results indicated that when the number of sensors increases,
the total objective function increases while the number of
iterations needed for convergence does not change. However,
to enable faster convergence for the convex problem, other
methods such as the fast proximal gradient method should be
used instead of the gradient ascent algorithm.
C. Barrier Coverage
For the barrier coverage, sensing areas of adjacent sensors
are required to overlap with each other to form a chain of sen-
sors called a barrier [210] to detect any intruders that attempt
to cross the network. The authors in [211] addressed mapping
mobile sensors to grid points of 2-Dimensional (2D) barrier
for underwater sensor networks using a first-price sealed-bid
auction scheme. Through bidding strategy, the auction allows
determining and assigning the mobile sensor closest to a grid
point and thus minimizing energy consumption of mobile
sensors. As shown in Fig. 20(a), mobile sensors which act
as bidders, i.e., buyers, will bid on the particular grid point
via a central sensor, i.e., an auctioneer. Each bid includes a
price which is inversely proportional to the sensor’s distance
to the grid point. The sensor with the highest price, i.e., the
shortest distance, is assigned to the grid point. Simulation
results showed that the maximum movement that one sensor
must travel to its assigned location is shorter than that of
a classic optimal solution, e.g., Hungarian method [204].
Although the proposed approach results in reducing energy
consumption for the barrier construction, the energy balance
has not achieved since only the distance factor is considered.
In addition, remaining energy of each sensor can be included
for the bid evaluation to obtain better energy balance, and thus
maximize the lifetime of network.
Similar to [211], the authors in [212] also considered the
assignment of sensors to the grid points using the first-price
sealed-bid auction scheme. However, this approach is applied
to 3-Dimensional (3D) barrier which is more realistic in
underwater sensor networks. As shown in Fig. 20(a), after
the chain of sensors in the 2D barrier is formed, no moving
intruders can cross the chain undetected. However, in 3D
spaces (see Fig. 20(b)), there may exist a hole which the
intruders can pass through. Therefore, compared to the 2D
barrier, the number of required grid points in 3D spaces is
larger which requires more bidding rounds.
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Fig. 20. Market based mechanism for a) 2D coverage and b) 3D coverage.
D. Target Tracking
The object tracking is also an important part of WSNs in
monitoring and surveillance applications. The core object clas-
sification and detection process can be efficiently performed by
supervised machine learning algorithms [213]. To improve the
probability of object detection, pricing models are employed
to predict the future locations of the targeted object and to
schedule the sensor nodes in an efficient energy manner while
guaranteeing the tracking quality.
The authors in [214] adopted a first-price sealed-bid auction
for the target tracking task allocation in WSNs. Specifically,
when a sensor finds a target within its vicinity, and there is no
leader in the network, it promotes itself as a leader candidate
which acts as an auctioneer, i.e., a seller. Then, the leader
sends a broadcast message to recruit sensors, i.e., buyers,
for the target tracking task. Upon receiving the message, the
sensors evaluate the task and respond to the leader by bids.
The leader evaluates and ranks these bids to select a predefined
number of buyers who have the highest bid. The chosen
buyers perform the target tracking task and send the target
data to the seller. Compared with the traditional task allocation
protocols for target tracking, e.g., the case-based reasoning
dynamic coalition scheme [215], the proposed approach does
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not need the knowledge of the neighbors in advance. Thus, it
saves more storage and computing resources of the sensors.
In addition, since less communication between the buyer and
the sellers is required, the more energy can be saved. The
simulation results indicated that the energy that the auction
based scheme can save is more than 65% compared to that
in [215]. However, the proposed approach did not consider
the target data quality. Taking this attribute, the authors in
[216] proposed an energy efficient target tracking algorithm
with high accuracy, called Auction-based Adaptive Sensor
Activation (AASA). First, a cluster head, i.e., an auctioneer
(a seller), predicts the next location of the target via a linear
prediction method and broadcasts a message to activate the
sensors, i.e., buyers, in the predicted region. Once receiving
this message, each buyer evaluates the task and responds to the
auctioneer by a bid. The bid is a function of the residual energy
of the sensor and the distance between itself and the predicted
target location. The seller chooses the buyers with the highest
bids for performing the target tracking task. The target data
sent from the chosen buyers is used by the seller to estimate
the location of the target through an improved trilateration
algorithm [217]. Compared with the general tracking algorithm
based on a cluster and prediction in which all the one-hop
neighbor nodes of cluster head take part in tracking, the
simulation results showed that the AASA algorithm greatly
decreases the energy consumption and increases the network
lifetime while achieving high tracking quality. The same
results were obtained when the AASA algorithm is compared
with the prediction-based clustering algorithm [218] as shown
in [219].
The above approaches only consider the scenario with a
single target. When multiple targets need to be tracked, the
combinatorial auction can be employed to improve resource ef-
ficiency. The authors in [220] proposed a multi-target tracking
mechanism based on the combinatorial auction. Specifically,
a sensor needs to perform multiple tasks to track the targets
in a battlefield. Due to the resource constraint, some close
targets can be combined into a cluster, i.e., a bundle, and
the sensor only needs to track a midpoint of the cluster.
However, the problem is how to assign the targets to clusters
such that the tracking performance in terms of the resource
efficiency is maximized. The authors considered this problem
as the combinatorial auction in which a sensor management
agent acts as a buyer who purchases the resources such as
sensing time, from the sensor, i.e., the seller, to accomplish
the multi-target tracking tasks. First, the targets in a battlefield
are assigned into clusters, i.e., bundles, which form a target
set. Since there can be many target assignments, we may get
several available target sets. Then, the sensor management
agent calculates a performance-price (also known as benefit-
cost) ratio for each target set. The price is the sum of resource
costs for completing the tasks, and the performance is the total
value of targets being destroyed. The target set that has the
highest performance-price ratio is considered as the winner of
the auction. When the battlefield environment changes, e.g.,
a new target arrives, the auction can be conducted again.
However, the computation complexity of the algorithm is high
and requires much processing time.
Summary: The reviewed papers in this section have shown
that the pricing models are useful for solving problems con-
cerning sensing coverage and target tracking. The issues along
with references are summarized in Table VI. From the table,
we observe that auctions are used efficiently to address issues
of area and coverage as well as target tracking while the NUM
framework can be applied for optimizing the target coverage.
The next section reviews the use of pricing models for security
and intrusion detection. The security component of a WSN
guarantees the confidentiality of the collected sensors’ data.
VII. APPLICATIONS OF PRICING MODELS FOR DOS
ATTACK PREVENTION AND PRIVACY CONCERNS
WSNs are vulnerable to security threats. Various WSN
security protocols were classified and evaluated in [221].
However, the traditional protocols lack interactions among
strategies of rational decision makers (i.e., the attacker and
the WSN owners) which strengthen the network security [222].
Due to this fact, pricing models have been employed to address
secrurity and privacy issues in WSNs with the following
approaches.
• DoS attack prevention: A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
is a deliberate action of one or many sensor nodes with
the aim of interrupting or suspending services of WSNs.
In this case, pricing strategies can be used to detect and
isolate the attackers.
• Privacy concerns: Privacy involves the issues related to
the sensitive private data of phone users in the data
aggregation. Indeed, the collected data may include the
location information which can reveal sensitive informa-
tion, e.g., home address of users. Thus, using pricing
models may provide incentive mechanisms for users’
privacy protection.
A. DoS Attack Prevention
The authors in [223] proposed a secure sensor network
routing protocol based on a first-price sealed-bid auction to
isolate malicious sensors. A source sensor (seller) selects a
secure route which is formed by other sensors (buyers) in the
network to forward packets to its destination. The secure route
does not include any sensor that acts maliciously by dropping
incoming packets, which is also known as the passive DoS
attack. First, the source sensor broadcasts a route request to its
neighbors as shown in Fig. 21(a). Then, its neighbors forward
this request to the others. When the destination receives this
request, it sends back a reply message including the full source
route and the bid price. Each bid price represents a route and
includes the sum of utilities of all sensors on the route. The
utility of a sensor is calculated using the theory of equity,
reciprocity, and competition [224]. The utility depends on the
sensor’s battery power and reputation. Among available routes,
the source sensor selects the best one, which has the highest
bid, stores it and sends messages along that route. The sensors
on the winning route will get good reputation as their rewards,
and they will spend a percentage of the initial power as their
payments. Since the sensors on a route desire to get the good
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TABLE VI
APPLICATIONS OF PRICING MODELS FOR SENSING COVERAGE AND TARGET TRACKING
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
Area
coverage
[205]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Mobile
sensor
Static
sensors
Hole
coverage
Buyers submit bid prices, and the seller
accepts to heal a hole with the highest
price
Area coverage
maximization
Competitive
equilibrium
[207]
[208]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Mobile
sensor
Static
sensors
Hole
coverage
Same as [205] but a virtual movement
strategy is considered
Area coverage
maximization, and
energy efficiency
Competitive
equilibrium
Target
coverage [209]
Network utility
maximization Sensor
Resource
provider Energy
Maximizing the aggregate utilities of
sensors subject to the constraints of
energy and overlapping
Sensing range
maximization
Optimization
solution
Barrier
coverage
[210]
[211]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Central
sensor Sensors
A grid point
of 2D
barrier
Buyers submit bid prices, and the seller
selects a buyer with the highest price
Energy consumption
minimization
Competitive
equilibrium
[212]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Central
sensor Sensors
A grid point
of 3D
barrier
Same as [210] Energy consumptionminimization
Competitive
equilibrium
Target
tracking
[214]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Leader
sensor Sensors
Target
tracking task
Buyers submit bidding price, and the
seller selects a predefined number of
buyers with the highest prices to perform
the task
Resource efficiency Competitiveequilibrium
[216]
[219]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Cluster
head Sensors
Target
tracking task Same as [214]
Resource efficiency,
network lifetime
maximization, and
high quality of
tracking
Nash
equilibrium
[220]
Combinatorial
auction Sensor
Sensor
management
agent
Resources
Seller assigns targets to bundles for
tracking such that the performance-price
ratio is maximized
Resource efficiency,
and high tracking
accuracy
Optimal
solution
Source
Destina tion
(c)
Source
Destina tion
BidBid
Bid Bid
(b)
Source
Destina tion
(a)
Route 
request
Route 
request
Fig. 21. (a) Route request is sent, (b) route reply includes the bid price, and
(c) path is established (represented by the solid line).
reputation from the source, they are forced to cooperate to
forward incoming packets.
Although [223] can mitigate malicious sensors causing the
disruption to routing, there are some malicious sensors which
could agree to the auction but will subvert the route later. A
watch-list [225] which records the sensors’ misbehavior can
be used to recognize such malicious sensors and then let all
sensors not communicate with them. It also was proved that for
the given strategic game, the utility, i.e., the amount of bid that
each node offers and a set of available bidding strategies of
sensor i, there is always a Nash equilibrium at which a sensor
i bids the amount b∗(vi) = (1− 1N )vi, where N is the number
of sensors, and vi is the total amount of bid that each node is
willing to pay. For example, for the case of 100 sensors, the
average number of dropped packets remains steady and the
total number of dropped packets is less than a half of that of
the CONFIDANT protocol [226]. The reason is that sensors
with bad reputation in the proposed protocol will be ignored
by the majority of sensors. Extending these approaches, the
QoS of the network can also be improved in terms of security
and delay by incorporating the information of hops from the
source to the destination into each bid price.
B. Privacy Concerns
One of challenges in participatory sensing and crowdsensing
is that the deployment of these systems can reveal users’
private information such as location and identity. Therefore,
pricing mechanisms may be useful to control users’ privacy.
Specifically, if the payment is lower than the privacy price,
the users may not have enough motivation to perform sensing
tasks.
1) Privacy evaluation: It is natural to determine the value
of the privacy. The authors in [227] conducted a survey
with 200 anonymous participants. The results showed that the
participants’ average rating about the importance of privacy is
5.82 on a scale from 1 (not important) to 7 (very important).
This confirms that the privacy is globally important to the
users. For the incentives, 41% of participants would provide
their information for free, 27% would get a monetary reward,
22% would like to get free data access, and 14% of them
expected additional application features. Furthermore, 18%
would receive coupons while 6% would like to be given a
higher reputation. This indicates that incentive mechanisms are
very important in privacy-aware participatory sensing systems.
The authors in [228] aimed at determining how much price
must be offered to persuade someone to expose their location
information for a certain time period through using schemes
from experimental economics and psychology. Specifically, the
authors employed the sealed-bid second-price reverse auction
and invited volunteers, i.e., sellers, to participate in a fictitious
study. The study involves the collection and the processing
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of the location information from their mobile phones. The
auction mechanism was chosen to guarantee that sellers are
motivated to report the true value of their location privacy.
The application, i.e., the buyer (auctioneer), asks the volun-
teers to submit asking prices for their location privacy. The
buyer then invites a certain number of participants with the
lowest asking prices and pays an amount of money which is
equivalent to the lowest price of the seller who is lost. The
study is performed among computer science students at the
University of Cambridge. The results indicated that a median
asking price of 10 pounds is needed for the location privacy.
However, when the possibility of commercial interests was
mentioned, the median asking price increases to 20 pounds.
Since this study is based on a small group of students who
are likely to have lower privacy preferences than the general
population, the result is only considered as a lower bound on
the location privacy preference. Moreover, only the winners
get reward while the users who lose in the asking process get
no compensation at all for their privacy revelation. Consider
more users’ incentive, the authors in [229] and [230] focused
on the rewarding process. Accordingly, all anonymous users
receive rewards which are either credits [229] or tokens [230],
as long as they submit at least n reports. The reward may be
monetary return or promotion for using location-based services
afterwards as mentioned in [231].
2) Privacy-preserving mechanisms: Privacy-preserving
mechanisms aim to guarantee that user’s data is not associated
with its identity [232]. In [228], [229] and [230], a privacy
protection mechanism for participants is ignored. Considering
this problem, the authors in [233] proposed a seal-bid
second-price reverse auction that requires users only to
submit their asking prices with obscure locations. After the
asking process, the winning users reveal their true locations
when submitting the sensed data. However, in this case, it
can be seen that the buyer’s utility is sacrificed. The buyer
does not have the knowledge of users’ accurate locations and
cannot evaluate the actual utility of each user. The buyer then
may overpay or underpay for the received data.
Another method to preserve the user privacy is to use the
pseudonym to replace a user’s real identity. The authors in
[234] adopted the sealed-bid second-price reverse auction in
which the asks are encrypted before being submitted using a
cryptographic method, called Time Lapse Cryptography (TLC)
[235]. Furthermore, before being forwarded to a server, i.e.,
an auctioneer, the asks are signed by the users by employ-
ing the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme [236] to keep the
confidentiality of the asks. Finally, a set of users who have
the encrypted asking prices lower than a payment threshold
is selected as winners to provide sensing data. The payment
threshold influences the outcome of the auction. However,
how to calculate the threshold was not given in the proposed
approach.
In addition to the ask privacy, the seller anonymity and
fairness problems were considered through using a sealed-
bid multi-attribute reverse auction in [237]. The attributes
of an ask which are the price, the location accuracy, and
the sampling frequency are converted to the ask utility score
through the linear utility function in [238]. The asks are
encrypted by using the Paillier’s encryption [239] before being
submitted to the server. Then, the private set intersection
algorithm in [240] was adopted for the winner determination.
The proposed scheme does not need to open asks to perform
the winner determination and the public verifiability which
allows anybody to check the identities of bidders and confirm
whether their bids are valid or not. Thus, the strong ask
privacy is maintained in the auction execution. According
to the security analysis, the proposed scheme satisfies the
security requirements of an electronic auction (e-auction), such
as anonymity, ask privacy, and public verifiability. The same
approaches can be found in [241] and [242]. However, in
[241], instead of using the Paillier’s encryption, each seller
masks its ask with a hash value which is computed from
a random number. The one-wayness of the hash function
guarantees that ask values remain hidden, thus eliminating the
possibility that a seller or the server can leak information about
the others before the asking process ends. As a result, the
confidentiality of asks is better maintained compared to [237].
Finally, the server collects all submitted asks and determines
the winners who have the highest utility scores. However, to
improve the winning chances for the losers in the next rounds,
the number of previously lost auction rounds should also be
included as one of the ask attributes as proposed in [242].
3) Faked sensing attacks prevention: In addition to the
above security issues, crowdsensing networks are also vul-
nerable to faked sensing attacks by users to save sensing costs
and avoid privacy leakage [243]. Traditional secure mecha-
nisms, e.g., [244], were proposed to evaluate the received
sensing reports. However, it is challenging for the server to
calculate the actual costs. Therefore, price based approaches
were proposed to stimulate the users to submit their actual
reports and then pay the users according to their sensing
accuracies. The authors in [245] formulated the problem as a
secure mobile crowdsensing game among selfish users and a
server through a sealed-bid first-price reverse auction scheme.
The users choose their strategies for their ask prices while
the server determines the payment strategy to maximize the
individual utility. The set of optimal strategies yields a unique
Nash equilibrium for the asking strategy of the users and
pricing strategy of the server. However, the actual costs, which
form the utility functions, are unknown by the server and
users. Therefore, when the game is repeated, e.g., the server
requires the sensing data continuously, reinforcement learning
methods such as Q-learning [246] can be employed by the
server to determine its payment strategy according to the
utility history for the previous trials. The proposed learning
strategy can motivate the users to send higher-quality sensing
reports and significantly decrease the number of faked sensing
reports. This was confirmed by the simulation results that the
probability of a user sending an actual sensing report is greater
than 97% after 300 time slots.
The same approach was also adopted in target tracking
applications [247] in which a fusion center, i.e., a buyer, needs
to collect sensing data from different users, i.e., sellers, to
determine a state of the target. However, unlike [245], the
buyer’s uncertainty about the value of a user’s ask is described
by a continuous probability distribution which allows calculat-
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ing the expected utility functions of users directly instead of
using the Q-learning algorithm. The solution of the auction is
obtained from solving the multiple-choice knapsack problem
to achieve the maximum utility for the fusion center. The
optimality of the solution is guaranteed while the rationality
and the truthfulness properties are achieved.
Summary: This section discusses the existing security
approaches which are entirely based on auction schemes
as summarized in Table VII. Although these schemes have
tackled some issues related to the DoS attack prevention and
the privacy, future researches are required to address other
security related issues, e.g., intrusion detection and coexistence
with malicious sensors. The following section reviews the
application of pricing models to address some other issues
in IoT apart from those discussed above.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
In this section, we review some other issues related to the
use of pricing models for faulty sensor detection, surveillance,
and profit maximization of IoT service providers. Moreover,
the pricing models for IoT services are reviewed.
A. Pricing Models for Faulty Sensor Detection
In addition to the security, another risk which affects the
reliability is the presence of faulty sensors. Sensor faults of
WSNs can be divided into two categories, i.e., hard and soft
[248]. A sensor is hard fault if the sensor cannot communicate
with other sensors due to the failure of a certain module, e.g.,
the failure of the communication module and energy depletion
of the sensor. A sensor is soft fault meaning that the failed
sensor can continue to work and communicate with other
sensors, but the sensed or transmitted data is not correct. The
authors in [249] proposed a risk-aware robotic sensor network
applied to critical infrastructure protection with the aim of
detecting and mitigating the faulty sensors using an auction.
The proposed approach is a task allocation mechanism which
recruits the sensors with the best fitness to risk-mitigation
plan. Specifically, a sensor which is first aware of a high risk
network event becomes an auctioneer. Then, the auctioneer
broadcasts a risk-mitigation task announcement message to
all available sensors. This message contains the event location
and the necessary risk details so that each receiving sensor can
appropriately bid on the task. Upon receiving the message, by
using the Sugeno fuzzy model [250], each sensor calculates its
bid based on three primary data sources including the available
battery level, the distance from the sensor to the event, and
the coverage redundancy. The sensors with the highest bid are
selected as the winners to perform the risk-mitigation task.
Since the bid is proportional to the available energy of sensors,
the proposed mechanism avoids overwhelming the sensors
with low energy. However, this approach did not consider how
to determine the auctioneer in the situation where there are
multiple sensors detecting a high risk event simultaneously.
B. Pricing Models in Pervasive Monitoring Applications
This section considers using pricing models for pervasive
monitoring applications such as secure house and secure
gallery. In such applications, there are several security devices
installed. To reduce resource costs while still maximizing the
expected Value of Information (VoI), a switch option model
was adopted. Switch option (see Chapter 10 in [251] for more
details) is a special type of the real options which has been
widely used in economics to select the mode of production for
factories or switching between investment options to maximize
the profit or to minimize loss. The authors in [252] adopted the
switch option model to maximize the VoI in a parking garage
monitoring network. The system consists of two services: a mi-
crophone service of reading from an acoustic sensor to monitor
the sound volume and a camera service that provides views of
the area covered by the microphone monitors. The VoI from
a device depends on the information volume obtained from
that device and the resources consumed by the device [253].
As shown in Fig. 22(a), when two devices are simultaneously
active, the expected VoI obtained from the devices is low since
typically the camera requires a large amount of resources.
Therefore, in a normal mode, i.e., no event, the microphone
service is switched on while the camera service is switched
off. Only when there is a loud noise which can signify a
pervasive event, the microphone service is switched off since
its VoI becomes lower due to the limited information provided.
At this time, the camera service is activated alternatively to
provide the information. Therefore, as indicated in Fig. 22(b),
the expected VoI is always higher than that of the situation
activating both the devices. However, how to determine a
threshold to switch the two devices was not given.
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Fig. 22. (a) Expected VoI value when two devices work simultaneously and
(b) expected VoI value when the switch option model is used.
C. Pricing Models for the Platform’s and IoT Service
Provider’s Utility Maximization
Maximizing the utility of a platform can be achieved by ei-
ther maximizing the collected data gain or minimizing overall
costs of recruiting participants to provide sensing service. The
authors in [254] modeled an incentive negotiation procedure
as a two-stage Stackelberg game with the aim of minimizing
the platform’s incentive budget. In the first stage, the platform
which acts as a leader decides the payment to each participant.
In the second stage, the participants, i.e., followers, strategize
sensing time to maximize their own utilities. The second
stage can be considered as a non-cooperative game, and it
was proved that for a given payment, there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium involving a set of optimal strategies of the
participants. The Nash equilibrium together with the optimal
payment strategy of the platform constitutes a solution called
Stackelberg equilibrium. However, this approach requires com-
plex computational procedures on participants’ smart devices.
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TABLE VII
APPLICATIONS OF PRICING MODELS FOR STRENGTHENING AND PRIVACY SECURITY
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
DoS
attack
prevention
[223]
[225]
First-price
sealed-bid
auction
Source
sensor
Forwarding
sensors Reputation
Buyers submit bid prices, and the seller
selects buyers with the highest prices
Secure routing
improvement
Nash
equilibrium
Pr
iv
ac
y
co
nc
er
ns
[228]
Seal-bid
second-price
reverse auction
Phone
users Platform
Location
privacy
Sellers submit their asking prices and
location information. The buyer selects the
winners owning the lowest asking prices
Incentive
compatibility, and
buyer’s revenue
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
[229]
[230]
Seal-bid
second-price
reverse auction
Phone
users Platform
Location
privacy Same as [228]
Incentive
improvement
Nash
equilibrium
[233]
Seal-bid
second-price
reverse auction
Phone
users Platform
Location
privacy
Same as [228] but only winners submit
their location information
Incentive
compatibility, buyer’s
revenue
maximization, and
privacy security
Nash
equilibrium
[234]
Seal-bid
second-price
reverse auction
Phone
users Server Real identity
Sellers submit their encrypted asks. The
buyer selects the winners owning the
asking prices lower than a threshold
Incentive
compatibility, buyer’s
revenue
maximization, and
privacy security
improvement
Nash
equilibrium
[237]
Multi-attribute
reverse auction
Phone
users Server
Location
accuracy and
sampling
frequency
Sellers submit their multi-attribute asks
corresponding to utility scores which are
encrypted by the Paillier’s encryption. The
buyer determines the winners with the
highest utility scores
Incentive
compatibility, privacy
security, and well
fairness
Bayes-Nash
equilibrium
[241]
[242]
Multi-attribute
reverse auction
Phone
users Server
Location
accuracy and
sampling
frequency
Sellers submit their multi-attribute asks
which are masked with hash value, and
the buyer determines the winners with the
highest utility scores
Incentive
compatibility, privacy
security
improvement, well
fairness, and
confidentiality
maintenance of asks
Bayes-Nash
equilibrium
[245]
Seal-bid
first-price
reverse auction
Phone
users Server Sensing data
Sellers submit their asking prices, and the
buyer selects the winners owning the
lowest asking prices
Faked sensing report
minimization, and
individual utility
maximization of
sellers and buyer
Nash
equilibrium
[247]
Seal-bid
first-price
reverse auction
Phone
users
Fusion
center Sensing data
Sellers submit their asks, and the buyer
selects users to buy data to achieve
maximum utility
Sellers’ rationality
and truthfulness, and
buyer’s utility
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
Moreover, it also requires that the platform needs to know the
actual sensing cost of all participants.
A more simple mechanism was proposed in [255] by using
reverse auctions. Accordingly, the platform, i.e., the buyer,
has a utility function associated with its set of tasks. After
receiving the asks from the participants, the platform shortlists
the potential winners, i.e., sellers, using a greedy linear time al-
gorithm that allows determining the user with the best marginal
utility. Then, each user in the shortlist is kept, dropped or
replaced depending on the effective utility that it contributes to
the platform. Finally, the platform makes the payment strategy
which is similar to the VCG mechanism. Specifically, each
user is paid according to its marginal utility that it brings
to the platform, and according to the increase in utility by
replacing any user by the next best user plus the bid of the
next best user. Theoretical analysis indicated that the proposed
strategy maximizes the platform’s utility while guaranteeing
four properties of an efficient auction that are computational
efficiency, individual nationality, profitability and truthfulness.
This also was demonstrated by simulation results in which
the platform’s utility of the proposed algorithm was improved
by roughly 15% comparing with the scheme in [254] since it
has to pay the selected users less. However, from the users’
side, the more-frugal payment can reduce their incentives in
providing data.
After data is collected from the platform, the useful in-
formation will be extracted to sell to the service providers.
The service providers’ utilities are often the profits that they
earn from re-selling the information to the IoT customers. The
information can be treated as items traded in the market, and
the main problem is how to set prices for the sensing infor-
mation so that the service providers’ profits are maximized.
Consider a competitive market involving IoT service providers,
the authors in [30] formulated the competition in setting the
price as a non-cooperative game. The players are the service
providers, i.e., sellers, and the strategy of each player is to
set the price of the sensing information to maximize his own
payoff, i.e., profit. The set of the best strategies of the players
yield the highest payoffs, i.e., the Nash equilibrium. Based on
the proposed sensing service pricing model, the marginal cost
to reproduce the information is likely to be zero. It means that
some service providers can buy information and resell to the
others, thereby hierarchical games, e.g., Stackelberg game, are
required.
Consider such a hierarchical information market, the au-
thors in [256] investigated the information service pricing by
formulating the Stackelberg game, among service providers,
brokers, and customers. The brokers acquire information from
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the providers, i.e., leaders, and sell the services to the cus-
tomers, i.e., followers. Two strategies, the bundling strategy
and the pure components strategy, are adopted to calculate
information selling prices which maximize profits for the
service providers and the brokers. The theoretical analysis
was also given to specify which strategy (i.e., bundling or
pure components) should be used based on the relationship
between the information collection cost and the willingness-
to-pay value of the customers. However, the method to let
service providers form bundling has to be devised.
D. Pricing Models for Evaluating the IoT Deployment
As discussed earlier, mobile sensors were found useful
to address issues in WSNs, e.g., sensing coverage and data
collection. In addition to the technical advantages, the authors
in [257] adopted the cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the
deployment utility of mobile sensors compared with static
sensors from the economic perspective. Here, the benefit
of a mobile node is to replace a certain number of static
nodes while still guaranteeing the functionality of the network,
e.g., area coverage, mobile relay, target coverage, and barrier
coverage. Consider the k-coverage with k = 1 meaning that
every point in the target area is covered by at least 1 sensor, it
was indicated that one mobile sensor is equal to five static
sensors. The Micaz mote [258] was adopted for the cost
model. Micaz is a widely used sensor, and thus its cost is
used for the evaluation. The cost of a static sensor is $100
while that of a mobile sensor is $150 including extra cost
of peripherals (e.g., motor and wheels). Therefore, the overall
economic benefit of using a mobile node against static sensors
is $100× 5− $150 = $350.
Different from [258], the authors in [259] adopted the cost-
benefit model to analyze the impact of deploying the different
IoT devices based on the profits of stakeholders in supply
chain applications. A supply chain is a system to move goods
from a producer to customers via shippers. To monitor and
improve the condition of goods transportation in the supply
chains, IoT devices, e.g., barcode, RFID, and sensors, are
embedded with the goods. The RFID transponders can provide
sensor information of the goods, e.g. temperature or pressure
or humidity, during the transport and enable the monitoring
of goods. By calculating the cost and the benefit of each
stakeholder, i.e., the producer, the shipper, and the customer,
the authors showed that although the initial cost for deploying
smart IoT devices, e.g., wireless sensors, is higher, the profits
of the stakeholders are higher than that of only using barcodes
or RFID.
In practice, the RFID devices can be integrated with the
sensors to improve the operational and functional capacities
of the IoT systems [260]. For example, the RFID readers and
the sensors can combine with multi-functional devices, such
as PDAs and cell phones so that consumers are able to read
any RFID sensor tag in many applications [261]. In terms of
reader-relay integrated architectures, an integration of WSNs
and RFIDs was proposed in [262]. This architecture has two
layers in which the upper layer consists of integrated nodes of
RFID readers and wireless relays, called reader-relay nodes.
The lower layer is light nodes which are either sensors or
tags, called porter nodes. The two-layered hierarchical archi-
tecture aims at distributing the sensing and relaying tasks over
the components of integrated networks optimally. However,
this also imposes several challenges and requirements. The
most important issue refers to the additional costs related
to designing and deploying integrated hardware components.
The authors in [263] analyzed the factors which can reduce
costs when the integrated system is deployed. There are fours
major factors affecting the cost reduction, i.e., the porter nodes
density, porter nodes traffic load, the transmission distance
between the porter nodes and the reader-relay nodes, and the
delivery guarantee. For example, when the number of porter
nodes is increased, each node in the network can reduce their
power consumption to forward the packet from a source to a
sink, thereby decreasing the cost. However, the authors did not
specify which pricing model used to evaluate these factors.
Summary: This section reviews the use of pricing models
in some practical IoT applications, e.g., pervasive monitoring
systems and supply chains. Through the pricing models, both
economic and technical evaluations are provided. Moreover,
some pricing models for service markets are also introduced to
determine the selling prices and the profits of the stakeholders.
The following section reviews the application of pricing mod-
els to address issues in machine-to-machine communications.
IX. PRICING MODELS IN M2M COMMUNICATION
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication or Machine-
Type Communication (MTC) is a term used to describe
technologies that enable devices, e.g, computers, embedded
processors, smart sensors, actuators, and mobile devices to
communicate with each other via wired or wireless communi-
cation networks without human intervention [264]. Essentially,
M2M belongs to the IoT, since it has the four components
mentioned in Section II. B [265]. There are two typical
communication scenarios for the MTC communication: MTC
devices communicating with one or some MTC servers (see
Fig. 23(a)) and MTC devices communicating directly with
each other without intermediate MTC server (see Fig. 23(b)).
Several approaches have been proposed to address the M2M
issues such as the access control, the security, and the QoS
guarantee. There are also several surveys of M2M [266],
but they did not mention economic approaches. The idea
of applying economic models for M2M communication is
to enable the M2M entities to be interconnected, networked,
and controlled remotely, with low-cost, scalable, and reliable
architecture.
Such an approach can be found in [57] in which the
authors aimed at guaranteeing the required throughput in the
successive reserved time slots by combining the second-price
sealed-bid auction with the option pricing, so-called auction-
based option pricing model. The model consists of n devices,
i.e., buyers, which request the radio resource from a service
provider, i.e., a seller. Based on the second-price sealed-bid
auction rule, the service provider can select m among n buyers
as winners and the price that each winner must pay is the
(m+1)th highest bid price. In addition, the proposed approach
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provides a resource reservation scheme for the buyers in the
future. Accordingly, buyers can reserve the requested resources
at a pre-specified price and a pre-defined time via a call option
contract. The contract will protect the buyer against a higher
resource price in the future and also provide for the buyer
the right to purchase the requested resource quantity even
when the buyer is dropped from the auction. Moreover, a
convex cost function was introduced which allows the buyers
to choose the strike price, i.e., the price at which the call
option can be exercised, to minimize their reservation costs
while obtaining the guaranteed QoS in terms of throughput.
Under the proposed scheme, the transmission resources could
be allocated with the maximum utilization. However, the
assumption that the different M2M devices require the same
throughput in every time slot is not realistic.
MTC Device
Operator domain
MTC Device MTC Device
MTC Server
Operator domain
MTC Device
MTC Device MTC Device
MTC 
Device
MTC 
Device
MTC Device
(a) (b)
Fig. 23. (a) MTC devices communicating with MTC server, and (b) MTC
devices communicating directly with each other without intermediate MTC
server.
Given the framework of the sealed-bid auction, the authors
in [267] adopted the VCG auction mechanism to allocate the
packet arrival rate to M2M applications. The M2M applica-
tions are assumed to have different valuations on the same
period. For example, at the traffic peak hours, the valuation of
an M2M application in a vehicular network may be much
higher than those of others, e.g., an M2M application to
monitor environment. The auction-based model is illustrated in
Fig. 24 in which each application, i.e., a buyer, submits its bid
to a base station, i.e., an auctioneer, for the packet arrival rate.
Similar to the multi-attribute auction scheme discussed earlier,
each bid includes multiple parameters such as the application’s
valuation, the packet arrival rate requirement, and the resource
price which the buyer is willing to pay. The base station selects
the winners that maximize the social welfare and then charges
each winner according to the VCG payment strategy for a
truth-telling valuation report. The simulation results showed
that the transmission success probability can reach up to 97%.
However, the assumption that the packet arrival rate of each
M2M application is constant in each time slot is not realistic.
Also, the proposed solution did not provide any incentive
mechanism for the M2M applications to report their truthful
valuation. Finally, the M2M application server might not have
complete information or a perfect prediction about the packet
arrival rate.
To predict the packet arrival rate of the M2M applications,
the authors in [268] introduced a packet attempt estimation
stage through the maximum likelihood method before con-
ducting the auction. The estimation stage will predict the
number of applications which are trying to send packets
and thus allow the base station to assign time slots more
efficiently. The simulation results showed that the transmission
success probability can reach up to 99%, i.e., improved by 2%
compared to that in [267].
M2M Applications
(bidders)
Base station
(auctioneer)
1. Each bidder reports
- Valuation of periods
- Desired transmission rate
- Price of resource
2. Base station allocates
- Transmission rate
- VCG payment
Fig. 24. Rate allocation for M2M applications based on auction.
Consider an M2M service context model in which a group
of machines are used jointly for a certain purpose (i.e.,
M2M service), the authors in [269] addressed the charge
minimization for M2M communication based on the dynamic
smart data pricing. The model is shown in Fig. 25 in which
a group of machines M1,M2, . . . ,Mp are used to perform
monitor functions, e.g., gas meter, camera, and thermometer.
Accordingly, when a machine establishes an M2M commu-
nication with the application, the machine will be charged
by an online charging system. The charging process is based
on the smart data pricing, meaning that the network traffic
which is sent through the mobile network in the congestion
duration is charged at a higher price. The M2M server allows
to grant or postpone the M2M communication, depending on
the current communication requirements, e.g, emergency or
no emergency, and communication charge, e.g., congestion or
normal. For example, if there is an emergency situation, e.g., a
fire in a house, a requirement for priority is marked in packets
that allows them to be communicated with the lowest delay.
However, in a normal situation, if the M2M communication is
required while the network is congested, it can be postponed
until the congestion subsides. Therefore, the mechanism avoids
the high charge for the service providers and also improves
the efficiency of the network resource management. The same
approach can be found in [270] in which the tariff based on
the smart data pricing from electricity provider is used to
control operations of home appliances, i.e., in the smart grid
environment.
The authors in [269] did not consider the situations in which
there are more than one emergency communication required
simultaneously. Consider these situations, the authors in [271]
proposed a dynamic rate allocation scheme for M2M services
through the utility function. The model consists of a large
number of different M2M services, i.e., buyers, which require
to simultaneously access the Radio Access Network (RAN),
i.e., the seller. The objective is to optimize the rate allocation
to the M2M services under some constraints, e.g., total rate
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Fig. 25. Architecture for M2M service context model.
capacity of the RAN. Typically, the optimization problem can
be solved by using the utility function as discussed in the
previous approaches, e.g., [174]. However, the utility of the
M2M services in [271] is calculated proportionally to the
delay and the price that the M2M services must pay for
the allocated rate. Therefore, the optimization problem is to
minimize the utility function under the constraints. It was
proved that the objective utility function is concave, and there
are algorithms that can converge to a unique solution for the
rate allocation and the price. The simulation results showed
that the utility in terms of delay and price are lower than that
of the commonly used load balancing scheme [272]. However,
using the Newton’s method to obtain the converged optimal
rate in the proposed approach can result in slow convergence.
Summary: This section discusses the application of pricing
models in M2M communication. The existing approaches
addressed the resource allocations as summarized in Table
VIII. However, with the diverse characteristics of M2M traffic
in conjunction with the massive number of devices, mobility,
latency, reliability, security and power consumption still need
more investigations.
X. SUMMARY, OPEN ISSUES AND FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
A. Summary
The previous sections show that economic aspects are
important not only for business development, but also for
system design and implementation. Pricing introduces another
dimension of the problem that the traditional methods of
system optimization are not applicable. This is evident as a
lot of researchers are studying economic issues of IoT in
which many works reviewed in our survey have proposed
using different approaches to address various challenges. The
survey are organized according to the issues of IoT. Then,
different economic and pricing approaches are introduced and
analyzed to solve the issues. This helps network managers
to select desirable pricing schemes which satisfy their needs,
e.g., QoS improvement and payment minimization. Besides the
existing approaches, there are still some challenges as well as
research directions as discussed in the following subsection.
B. Challenges, Open Issues, and Future Researches of Apply-
ing Pricing Models In the Context of IoT
1) Combination of auction and other approaches: Most
of the aforementioned auction approaches consider only an
auction alone to solve the issues in sensing networks. In
practice, the advantages of auctions might be combined with
other non-auction methods to achieve better performance or
more flexible schemes. Such an example is a combination of
the reverse Vickrey auction and the posted price mechanism. In
the reverse Vickrey auction, the seller with the lowest price is
the winner and is paid the price of the second lowest ask. Since
the winner will get the price more than its expectation, sellers
are always stimulated to reveal their true cost when submitting
asks. Therefore, the payment policy of the reverse Vickrey
auction can guarantee the truthfulness of the mechanism.
Whereas, as discussed in Section III-B5 (and see Fig. 9), the
posted price mechanism does not require a soliciting process
as the reverse Vickrey auction. Therefore, the payment policy
of the Vicrkey auction can be employed in the posted price
mechanism to achieve both the truthfulness properties and
improve the speed of the mechanism.
2) Mobility of phone users: In the reverse auction-based
data collection approaches, e.g., [113] and [115], phone users
are assumed to be stationary, and they submit their offer prices
before sending their data to the server. The server selects the
phone users with the lowest prices as winners to provide data.
There may be a situation in which the phone users are selected
as winners but then move out of the area of interest. This may
degrade the utility of the platform. Therefore, the server needs
to keep track of the mobility pattern of each phone user. The
lightweight triangulation method [273] can be used to estimate
the next location of each phone user. The estimation value is
then considered as one of attributes to select the winners.
3) Confidentiality of bids: In auction approaches, bids of
bidders are assumed to be submitted simultaneously. However,
in practice bidders may not send their bids precisely at the
same time. If the auctioneer or any other party can recover
some of the bids before the bid opening, it can inform
a colluding bidder to cheat and win the auction. Security
protocols, e.g., the lightweight security protocol [250], which
guarantees the bid secrecy up until the opening phase is
required.
4) Payment security: Payment process is crucial to stimu-
late users to provide their sensing data. However, the messages
including privacy information, e.g., payment and user identity,
can be received by other irrelevant network users which
can be malicious users. Therefore, security problems for the
payment process should be analyzed, and the techniques for
the payment protection, e.g., using a bank along with an e-cash
scheme, need to be developed.
5) Complex resource market: Traditional auctions usually
contains three entities: buyers, sellers, and auctioneers. Buyers
purchase resources from sellers via the assistance of auction-
eers. However, in a more complex market, the trades can be
made between buyers and sellers directly, or among buyers
via an auctioneer, or among auctioneers. Also, resources can
be bought back, forfeited or lent. Such diversified market for
resources auctions need to be considered as the future work.
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TABLE VIII
APPLICATIONS OF PRICING MODELS IN M2M COMMUNICATION
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
R
es
ou
rc
e
al
lo
ca
tio
n
[57]
Second-price
sealed-bid
auction and
option pricing
Service
provider Devices Time slots
Buyers submit bid prices, and the seller selects
buyers with the highest prices. The buyers can
reserve the time slots in the future
Resource efficiency,
and throughput, i.e.,
QoS, guarantee
Nash
equilibrium
[267]
[268]
Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves
auction
Base station M2Mapplications
Packet
arrival rate
Buyers submit bids, each of which includes
application’s valuation, packet arrival rate, and
resource price. The seller selects winners by
solving the system evaluation maximization
problem and charges each winner with VCG
payment
Resource efficiency,
and welfare social
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
[269]
Smart data
pricing
Service
provider Machines Time slots
When receiving the communication requirements
from the buyers, the seller can grant or postpone
them based on the current type of the
requirement and its tariff
Resource efficiency,
charge minimization,
and QoS guarantee
Market
equilibrium
[270]
Smart data
pricing
Electricity
provider
Home
appliances Time slots Same as [269]
Resource efficiency,
charge minimization,
and QoS guarantee
Market
equilibrium
[271]
Utility
maximization
Radio access
network
M2M
services
Transmission
rate
Buyers submit requests to the seller for the
throughput. The seller finds optimal rate and
charge for the buyers through the utility function
Maximized
throughput, load
balance, and
minimized cost
Optimization
solution
6) Collusion and Price of Anarchy: In a competitive mar-
ket, service providers set selling prices to maximize their
own profits given the strategies of other providers. A Nash
equilibrium can be an appropriate solution as proposed in [30].
However, due to selfish behaviors of the service providers,
they can collude with each other to optimize their profits
collectively, and thus the Nash equilibrium become inefficient
[274]. The collusion among service providers and the price of
anarchy [275] can be investigated in the market.
7) Contract theory: Relay selection based on the Dutch
auction as proposed in [146] may require several iterations to
select the best neighboring sensor for the data forwarding, and
thus increasing the packet delay. Alternatively, we can employ
a contract theory for the relay selection to reduce the number
of iterations. A contract theory is to analyze how sellers and
buyers construct contractual arrangements, in the presence of
asymmetric information [276]. The asymmetric information
means that one part in the contract has more information
about the contract than the rest. Using contract theory in the
relay selection process in WSNs can be described as follows.
First, the source sensor, i.e., the buyer, designs incentive offers
involving items, e.g., the payment and desired signal-to-noise-
ratio at the destination. The source sensor then broadcasts
these offers to its neighboring sensors, i.e., sellers. If the
neighboring sensors are willing to relay data, they notify the
source with the contracts that they agree to accept. The source
with a limited budget can solve the relay selection problem as a
knapsack problem. In general, the contract approach is simple
to implement which requires minimal signaling overhead while
still guaranteeing QoS, i.e., data timeliness. Therefore, contract
theory can also be employed for the data collection among data
sellers, e.g., phone users, and a buyer, e.g, service provider or
data collector.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has provided a comprehensive survey of the
economic and pricing theory as well as their applications in
data collection and communication of IoT. Firstly, we have
presented a general architecture of an IoT system including
its components and services. To understand the motivations
of using the economic and pricing theory in IoT, we have
introduced fundamentals of various pricing models with their
general objectives. Then, we have provided detailed reviews,
analysis, and comparisons of approaches using the economic
and pricing theories for solving a variety of issues in sensing
networks, i.e., WSNs, participatory sensing, crowdsensing net-
works, and M2M communication. Finally, we have discussed
some open issues and important research directions. A survey
of the applications of the economic and pricing theory for
issues in other layers in IoT(e.g., cloud platform) is considered
as the future work.
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